Macro and micro determinants of seasoned equity offerings and issuer stock market performance by Virolainen, Matti
Macro and micro determinants of
seasoned equity offerings and
issuer stock market performance
Finance
Master's thesis
Matti Virolainen
2009
Department of Accounting and Finance
HELSINGIN KAUPPAKORKEAKOULU
HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
 
 
 
HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (HSE) 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MACRO AND MICRO DETERMINANTS OF SEASONED EQUITY 
OFFERINGS AND ISSUER STOCK MARKET PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finance 
Master’s thesis 
Matti Virolainen 
Fall 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by the Council of the Department  ____ / ____ 20____ and awarded  
the grade_______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I 
 
Helsinki School of Economics   
Master’s thesis    
Matti Virolainen 
 
MACRO AND MICRO DETERMINANTS OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS AND 
ISSUER STOCK MARKET PERFORMANCE 
 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the thesis is to provide new evidence on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) 
in general, and to address the partially lacking understanding of the SEOs in the UK. This 
thesis contributes to the ongoing discussion on causes of SEOs by being one of the first 
studies to investigate the macro level determinants. The thesis also addresses the question 
at  the  micro  level  by  comparing  SEO  firms  to  firms  who  choose  to  issue  debt  instead.  
Finally, the thesis examines the firm-specific pre-issue factors that contribute to the 
abnormal stock market performance of the issuers around the announcement of an SEO 
and in the long-term following an offering.  
 
DATA 
The data on seasoned equity offerings employed in the thesis is sourced from Dealogic 
and consists of UK seasoned equity offerings during period 1994-2008, while the total 
number of SEOs amounts to 2,670. At the firm-specific level, the availability of various 
data items shortens the sample period to range from 1999 to 2007, while the total number 
of  events  amounts  to  543.  Data  on  various  firm characteristics  and  accounting  items  is  
retrieved from Thomson Financial Worldscope, and data on analyst recommendations 
from Thomson Financial I/B/E/S history. Finally, data on stock prices, market indexes, 
interest rates and various economic fundamentals are from Datastream.  
 
RESULTS 
Results indicate that at the macro level, firms choose to conduct an SEO following 
periods of high stock market returns, and at times of rapid future sales growth among the 
listed firms, suggesting that market timing and demand for capital hypotheses of equity 
issuance hold. At the micro level, firms choose to issue seasoned equity for much of the 
same reasons, while in addition, information asymmetry seems contribute to the decision. 
 
Market timing, and to a lesser extent, demand for capital proxies have a positive linkage 
with SEO announcement effect. The findings also indicate that firms exploit window of 
opportunity to issue equity, since high volume period issuers undergo higher abnormal 
returns than low volume period issuers. In the long-term, the UK SEOs underperform in 
general, while the abnormal returns using market-to-book and firm size matched firms as 
the benchmark are less negative than suggested in the previous literature on the UK 
SEOs. Finally, the findings indicate that firms with ex ante demand for capital do not 
suffer from long-term underperformance, while market timers and firms with large issue 
sizes appear to be poor long-term investments.  
 
KEYWORDS 
Seasoned equity offerings, determinants of equity issue, event study, announcement 
effect, long-term underperformance
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Helsingin kauppakorkeakoulu   
Rahoituksen Pro Gradu-tutkielma         
Matti Virolainen 
 
MACRO AND MICRO DETERMINANTS OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS AND 
ISSUER STOCK MARKET PERFORMANCE 
 
TAVOITTEET 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on tuottaa uutta tutkimustietoa osakeantien determinanteista ja 
tarkastella osakeannin toteuttavien yhtiöiden suoriutumista osakemarkkinoilla yrityksen 
tuntomerkkien näkökulmasta. Tutkielma on ensimmäisiä osakeantipäätöksiin vaikuttavia 
makrotekijöitä kartoittavia akateemisia tutkimuksia. Lisäksi tutkielman tarkoituksena on 
määrittämää yrityskohtaisia, mikrotason tekijöitä, jotka selittävät miksi jotkut yhtiöt 
päätyvät tekemään osakeannin, ja toiset puolestaan nostamaan lisää vierasta pääomaa. 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on niin ikään määrittää osakeannin toteuttavien yhtiöiden 
epänormaaleihin tuottoihin vaikuttavia yrityskohtaisia tekijöitä osakeannin julkistus 
hetkellä, ja pitkällä aikavälillä annin toteuttamisen jälkeen.  
 
AINEISTO 
Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu Lontoon pörssissä listattujen yhtiöiden vuosien 1994 ja 
2008 välillä tekemistä osakeanneista, jotka on haettu Dealogic tietokannasta osakeantien 
kokonaislukumäärän ollessa 2,670. Yrityskohtaisella tasolla datan saatavuus rajoittaa 
tarkastelun kohteena olevan ajanjakson määrittyvän välille 1999–2007 osakeantien 
kokonaismäärän ollessa 543. Yrityskohtaiset taloudellisia muuttujia ja tunnuslukuja 
kuvaava tieto on peräisin Thomson Financial Worldscope tietokannasta ja analyytikkojen 
suositukset I/B/E/S history tietokannasta. Lisäksi käytössä ollut osakekurssidata, 
korkodata ja eri kansantalouden muuttujia kuvaava tieto on peräisin Datastream 
tietokannasta. 
  
TULOKSET 
Tulokset osoittavat, että makrotasolla tärkeimmät osakeanteihin vaikuttavat tekijät ovat 
osakemarkkinoiden tuotto ja listatuttujen yhtiöiden tulevaisuuden liikevaihdon kasvu. 
Näin ollen markkinoiden ajoittaminen ja rahoitustarve vaikuttavat positiivisesti 
osakeantien lukumäärään. Mikrotasolla osakeannin toteuttavat yritykset ajoittavat 
markkinaa ja tarvitsevat pääomaa, aivan kuten makrotasolla, mutta lisäksi tiedon 
epäsymmetria vaikuttaa negatiivisesti osakeannin toteuttamispäätökseen. 
 
Osakeannin julkistamisen aiheuttamaan epänormaaliin tuottoon vaikuttavat sekä 
markkinan ajoittaminen että rahoitustarve. Lisäksi yhtiöt hyödyntävät korkean 
osakeantivolyymin periodeita, jolloin yritysten epänormaalit tuotot julkistushetkellä ovat 
verrattain korkealla tasolla. Osakeannin jälkeen yritykset alisuoriutuvat pitkällä 
aikavälillä, mutta negatiiviset epänormaalit tuotot eivät ole niin suuria, kuin 
aikaisemmassa kirjallisuudessa on raportoitu. Pitkän aikaväliin osakemarkkinoilla 
suoriutumiseen vaikuttavat sekä osaketuotot ennen osakeantia että yrityksen 
rahoitustarve. Yhtiöt, joilla on kova pääomantarve, eivät alisuoriudu pitkällä aikavälillä, 
ja ovat näin ollen parempia osakesijoituksia, kuin markkinoita ajoittavat opportunistit. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background and motivation 
Seasoned equity offerings (SEO) have an important role in the world of finance regardless of 
the perspective of the observer. The equity offerings by seasoned firms have continuously 
been one of the most researched topics among academics, firms’ key financing decisions or 
alternatively, great source of income for investment bankers. SEOs have been one of the key 
areas of research in the field of corporate finance due to their significance as the firms’ 
financing event and somewhat anomalous stock market performance of equity issuers. 
Numerous authors document stock price run-up before equity issuance, negative response 
from the investors to the public announcement of the issue and finally, and also probably most 
strikingly, issuers continue to underperform their non-issuing peers for up to five years after 
the issue. Consequently, SEO announcements clearly represent a signal to investors similarly 
to other corporate events, but at the same time, not all the investors adjust their valuations to 
correct level as issuers continue to underperform various benchmarks. Traditional financial 
theories on capital structure, such as pecking order and tradeoff theory, cannot fully explain 
the empirically observed stock market performance of the issuers. The inability of the 
traditional theories has given rise to a series of new attempts to explain the SEO mechanisms. 
 
Equity  issues  have  been  found  to  occur  in  cycles  as  great  majority  of  the  SEOs  and  initial  
public offerings (IPO) tend to take place during hot periods, followed by times of low 
issuance volumes. Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that aggregate equity share in total capital 
issuance is a strong predictor of future market returns as high equity share in all new issues is 
often followed by exceptionally low returns. Similarly, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) find 
hot market issues and cold market issues to differ in quantity and issuer characteristics. 
Existing literature suggest various motives for firms to issue equity and thus, the equity cycles 
to exist. Firstly, Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that managers’ superior information gives 
them edge to make an attempt to time the equity market. Managers choose to issue equity 
when company is trading above its intrinsic value and repurchase shares at other times. 
Second, Dierkens (1991) on the contrary states that when information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders is large, the adverse selection costs of issuing equity are at their 
highest. High information asymmetry sways firms to look alternative ways to finance the 
projects as they are in afraid of a negative response from the investors. Third, according to 
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Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) firms’ investment opportunities, the demand for capital, can 
also have a large impact on the equity issuance decision. When the economy is booming, 
firms are likely to see a variety of promising positive NPV projects and consequently, 
shareholders have higher probability to gain adequate return on their investment, if they 
choose to invest more in the firms’ stock. Lastly, Lowry (2003) finds that investor sentiment 
is an important determinant for firms to go public, and therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that the mechanism for follow-on offerings could be similar. 
 
Investigation of issuer stock market performance has motivated numerous papers. Asquith 
and Mullins (1986) first report the negative market reaction to SEO announcement, while 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) throw light on the long-term underperformance of SEO firms. 
Thereafter a number of authors have replicated their findings, but the topic of interest has 
partly shifted from quantifying the performance to explaining the observed returns. Loughran 
and Ritter (1997) show deterioration in issuers’ operative performance to cause the 
underperformance, while Baker and Wurgler (2002) assume market timing of managers to 
account for the phenomenon. Fama (1998) questions the findings on post-issue 
underperformance and explains the stock price patterns to result from using inadequate 
models to measure abnormal returns. 
 
However, the recent findings in the area of SEOs by Dittmar and Thakor (2007), DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2007) and Alti and Sulaeman (2008) suggest that the SEO mechanism, 
both in terms of determinants of SEOs and the performance of issuers, has not fully been 
understood. The market timing theory continues to be among the leading theories in the 
literature on capital structure and motivation for SEO decision, but a debate goes on about the 
correct specification of the theory, and the characteristics of the firms that are likely to 
opportunistically time the market. Dittmar and Thakor (2007) state that the questions of why 
and when companies issue equity are still partly unanswered, as the recent attempts to address 
the questions have exposed gaps between stylized facts and traditional theories of capital 
structure and security issuance. 
 
A great majority of the studies on SEOs employ US data and Andrikopoulos (2009) concludes 
that the understanding of SEOs in context of the UK market is still fairly limited. Employing 
UK data, Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006) study the impact of 
the floatation method choice on stock market reaction to SEO announcement and report 
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negative announcement effect for rights issues and positive market reaction for private 
placements. Ngatuni, Capstaff and Marshall (2007) investigate the long-term post-issue stock 
market  performance  with  a  sample  of  UK  rights  issues,  and  report  significant  
underperformance for up to five years following an issue. Therefore, the US phenomenon 
seems to hold also in the UK. Furthermore, Andrikopoulos (2009) studies the weakening of 
the operative performance as a cause for post-issue long-term underperformance. He reports 
that firms time equity issues for periods when their operative outlook seems most favorable. 
As it appears, the UK evidence on stock market performance of equity issuers has broadened 
during the past few years. Yet, the determinants of equity issues have not been studied neither 
from the macro nor micro perspective, and the issuer stock market performance have not been 
fully explored.  
 
1.2  Research questions 
This thesis provides evidence on the determinants of equity issues from two perspectives: 
first,  I  investigate  the  factors  driving  the  changes  in  SEO  volume  as  an  economy-wide  
phenomenon and second, by comparing the attributes of firms that decide to issue equity with 
those who choose to use alternative ways of financing.1 In addition, I analyze the performance 
of equity issuers around the public announcement of the SEO and in the long-horizon by 
making an effort to quantify the impact of pre-announcement issuer characteristics to the 
stock market performance of the issuers. The most central research questions can be 
summarized in the following way: 
 
i) Which theories of those suggested in the corporate finance literature explain the 
economy-wide fluctuation in the UK SEO volume? 
ii) What are the firm characteristics that relate to the decision to issue equity? 
iii) How does the UK sample of equity issuers perform in the stock market around the 
announcement and in the long-horizon? 
iv) What is the link between firm-specific issuer characteristics and the stock market 
performance of the issuers? 
 
I perform time-series regression to study SEO macro determinants by following Lowry (2003) 
and Pastor and Veronesi (2005), who pool various theories on IPO issuance together and 
                                               
1 I use terms economy-wide and macro interchangeably when referring to the whole UK equity offering market. 
I also use terms firm-specific, micro and cross-sectional interchangeably when discussing the SEOs from a 
perspective of a single firm. 
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analyze the macro determinants of IPOs. In addition, I study the micro level determinants of 
SEOs by means of logit regression. Finally, I employ traditional event study methodologies to 
measure the impact of pre-issue firm characteristics on the stock market performance of SEO 
firms around the announcement and in the long-term. 
 
1.3  Contribution to the literature 
This thesis contributes to the prior literature in several ways. The thesis addresses the impact 
of different macro level determinants on the SEO volume following the unpublished working 
paper by Howe and Zhang (2009), which is the first attempt to study the fluctuation in SEO 
cycles from multiple theories’ perspectives. The thesis also pools together the macro and 
micro level factors to study the determinants of SEOs from both perspectives, while the prior 
literature  focuses  on  either  one  of  the  perspectives,  and  mainly  US  evidence  on  topic  exist  
(see, e.g., Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), Dittmar and Thakor 
(2007)). In addition, the thesis shows that the ex ante firm characteristics have explanatory 
power in explaining post-issue underperformance of SEO firms, while the existing literature 
concentrates on overvaluation and post-issue deterioration of operative performance as the 
primary causes of the phenomenon (see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1997), Andrikopoulos 
(2009)). 
 
By being a thorough investigation on various SEO phenomena, the thesis adds to the literature 
on UK SEOs in multiple ways. To my best knowledge, none of the earlier studies addresses 
the determinants of seasoned equity offerings in the UK. In addition, the thesis contributes to 
the existing UK studies on SEO firms’ stock market announcement effect, such as Slovin et 
al. (2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006), by employing ex ante firm characteristics that 
support various hypotheses on equity issuance as determinants of issuer stock market 
performance. Finally, the thesis provides new evidence on SEO firms’ post-issue 
underperformance. The earlier thorough investigations by Ngatuni et al. (2007) and Ho (2005) 
analyze the role of floatation method choice on the stock market performance of the issuers, 
but  neither  of  the  studies  analyzes  the  role  of  issuer  characteristics  on  the  stock  market  
performance. 
 
1.4  Results 
I find evidence that support market timing and demand for capital hypotheses as the macro 
level determinants of equity issues. When public firms’ future sales growth is rapid, firms 
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seek for external financing and SEO volume increases impressively. On the other hand, when 
the risk-free rate is low, firms have positive NPV projects available and the need for external 
financing increases through the discount rate channel. Also, firms issue equity after periods of 
high stock market returns. Specifically, my findings indicate that the past 12-month stock 
returns positively contribute to the macro SEO volume. At the micro level, market timing, 
information asymmetry and demand for capital all seem to have strong impact on the 
likelihood of using SEO as a means of financing. Besides, an analysis of the issuer 
announcement effect reflects that market timers are likely to face more optimistic market 
reaction than poor market timers. The role of past stock returns persists after various 
robustness checks. Interestingly, issuers during high periods of issuance volume undergo 
more optimistic market reaction than cold period issuers, but the results are driven by top 
quintile of issues taking place during the highest volume periods. I also find some evidence 
that SEOs by firms with high demand for capital are interpreted as positive news, while the 
reversal is true for low demand for capital firms. Finally, an analysis of the post-issue 
performance reveals that market timers are good investments during periods of 12 months or 
less while they begin to underperform at longer horizons. Firms with high demand for capital 
do not underperform their non-issuing peers, which suggests that some firms have a 
fundamental need for the issue and can put the proceeds into an efficient use. I additionally 
find that the underperformance seems to increase with the issue size and investors have some 
ability to pick the winning SEOs at the time of announcement. 
 
Earlier literature on IPO determinants conducted using US data reports similar factors to drive 
macro volume changes as I  find to be the case with the UK SEOs (see,  e.g.,  Lowry (2003),  
Pastor and Veronesi (2005)). At the micro level, US studies, such as Jung, Kim and Stulz 
(1996), report high leverage, past stock returns and market-to-book to be the strongest 
determinants of a firm choosing to issue equity over debt. I report similar findings and add a 
number of interesting results: analyst coverage, financial slack, sales growth and volatility 
seem  all  to  be  positively  related  to  the  likelihood  of  an  equity  issue  decision.  The  existing  
literature is not unanimous on the firm characteristics affecting announcement effect of SEOs 
(see, e.g., Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), Dittmar and Thakor (2007), Alti and Sulaeman 
(2008)). I confirm that the hot period issues seem to face more positive market reaction at the 
announcement and strong market timers with anticipated SEOs face positive interpretation by 
the stock market. In addition, the sales growth appears to have a positive but non-monotonic 
impact on the market reaction in the UK similarly to the US. Namely, Denis (1994) reports 
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subsamples of extreme performers to drive the phenomenon. Lastly, while existing literature 
mainly concentrates on the deterioration of operating performance following an issue (see, 
e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1997), Andrikopoulos (2009)), I report pre-issue characteristics to 
have explanatory power in post-issue performance of SEO firms. 
 
1.5  Limitations of the study 
This thesis is subject to two sources of limitations typically present in event studies to a 
certain degree. First, extensive requirements on data availability force to exclude significant 
proportion of SEOs out of the final sample due to missing key data items. Second, the long-
term event studies have been criticized for the model misspecification and inadequate 
benchmarks  to  measure  the  normal  returns,  both  of  which  can  bias  the  results  in  the  long-
term. As it comes to the data availability, there’s not much that can be done to avoid the 
problem. Overall, I consider the sample of SEOs of adequate size and reasonably well 
representative of the UK equity market activity. To overcome the second limitation, I employ 
and report results using two different models both in short-term and long-term event study. 
Moreover, short-term abnormal returns are based on often used market model and plain 
market adjusted returns, while I calculate long-term abnormal returns using both 1) FTSE All-
Share stock index and 2) size and market-to-book matched firms as the benchmark for normal 
returns. 
 
1.6  Structure of the study 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 highlights the relevant literature on 
equity issue determinants and the reported empirical evidence on issuer stock market 
performance. Chapter 3 motivates and presents the hypotheses tested in the thesis. Chapter 4 
presents the data collection process and the final data sample used in the study. Chapter 5 
reviews  the  methodologies  employed.  Chapter  6  shows  and  discusses  the  empirical  results.  
And finally, chapter 7 concludes the thesis. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter highlights the most relevant literature from the area of seasoned equity offerings. 
The first section concentrates on traditional theories of capital structure, while the second 
section summarizes the literature on the drivers of the SEO cycles and the determinants of 
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SEO decision. Finally, the third section summarizes the evidence on the stock market 
performance of the issuers around the announcement of the issue and in the long-term 
following an issue. 
 
2.1  Theories of capital structure 
In this section, I demonstrate the evolution of capital structure theories presented to explain 
the firm financial policy. Moreover, capital structure theories have relevance from capital 
issuance’s point of view, as the same theories have laid the foundation on explaining how a 
firm facing a need of external capital chooses between alternative ways of financing and 
additionally, how the stock market reacts to the public announcement of the issue.  
 
The extensive literature on modern capital structure theory started from Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958) arguments of irrelevancy of capital structure. Moreover, firm value was stated 
to be unaffected by the chosen capital structure.  Provided that a certain set of circumstances 
is met, their argument is that one capital structure in no better than the other. Modigliani and 
Miller framework, however, is based on demanding assumptions, such as no asymmetric 
information and efficient markets.  
 
In response to the neutrality of capital structure, Myers and Majluf (1984) present the pecking 
order theory of capital structure according to which a firm chooses to use internal capital to 
finance a project whenever possible and also, when external capital issue is required, the firm 
prefers riskless debt to risky debt and finally, risky debt to equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
show that if the managers have superior information and the company does not have financial 
slack or unused debt capacity, the managers may choose to reject a positive NPV project, 
given  that  the  company  would  be  forced  to  issue  equity  to  finance  the  project.  The  theory  
implies that some companies having a positive NPV project choose to forgo it as company 
equity is undervalued and dilution costs of the SEO outweigh the NPV of the project. On the 
contrary, others choose to forgo the project only if debt can be issued. The reluctance to issue 
equity whenever the firm’s common stock is underpriced, the authors state, is a result of 
asymmetric information. Consequently the market reaction to equity issue decision is likely to 
be negative as it reveals management seeing company equity being overvalued. Pecking order 
theory has been criticized by Fama and French (2005) due to its inability to explain why in 
reality a large proportion of companies issue equity. Fama and French conclude that in their 
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sample, between 1993 and 2003, 86 % of companies decided to issue equity and more than 50 
% of the observations in their sample violate the pecking order theory. 
 
An alternative theory, the tradeoff theory of capital structure, began to develop gradually 
when a correction to the neutrality of capital structure was presented by Modigliani and Miller 
(1963). They consider the earlier models on capital structure to be inadequate, since corporate 
taxation was ignored. Also, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) and Myers (1977) emphasize the 
importance of taking market imperfections, such as bankruptcy penalties and taxation on 
firms’ profits, better into consideration. Contrary to earlier theories of capital structure, the 
basic principle of the tradeoff theory assumes that a firm’s capital structure will be gradually 
guided toward optimum because its capital issue decisions are balanced between marginal 
costs of debt (increased bankruptcy risk) and marginal benefits (tax shields) of debt. The 
strength of tradeoff theory lies in its ability to explain cross-sectional differences in borrowing 
– safe and tangible generally borrow more, while risky growth firms face high risk of 
bankruptcy and choose to borrow less. Adding taxes to the analysis, Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) argue, implies more levered capital structures. The authors also point out that 
unexamined real-life patterns reflect the fact that it is in the companies’ interest to maintain 
financial flexibility in form of borrowing capacity.  
 
Tradeoff theory has taken leaps towards its current format over time as various authors test 
the implications of the theory on real life patterns. Myers (1977) considers a situation where a 
firm  facing  a  positive  NPV  project  has  an  excessive  amount  of  debt.  He  states  that  the  
company may have to forgo the opportunity as issuing more debt would imply high risk of 
default and new equity may not be available as the equityholders would have to bear the costs 
if the project failed. Myers (1977) therefore introduces the debt overhang problem. On the 
other hand, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) find empirical results suggesting that debt 
overhang  works  as  an  impediment  to  adjust  leverage  towards  firm’s  target  capital  ratio.  
Finally, Jensen (1986) considers a situation with a firm having too much equity and suggests 
that large free cash flow in existence of interest payments worseness the possible agency 
conflicts between managers and different claim holders of the firm. 
 
Despite its ability to explain some real world patterns, the tradeoff theory has been criticized 
extensively. Myers (1984) claim that if the tradeoff theory was true, firms would not have as 
low leverage ratios as they in reality appear to have. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) are of 
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the opinion that traditional pecking order model provides a better illustration of firms’ capital 
structure  policies  than  tradeoff  theory.  Further,  the  practical  evidence  on  a  number  of  firms  
giving up valuable debt tax shields contradicts with the theory’s building blocks. On the 
contrary, one of the implications of the tradeoff theory is that an increasing stock price leads 
to lower leverage and consequently, should guide the company into debt issuance. However, 
numerous authors, for instance Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Jung et al. (1996), point out 
that the increase in stock prices actually improves the likelihood of issuing equity. The 
pecking order and tradeoff theories continue to be an area of interest in finance literature and 
have continuously been debated (see, e.g., Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2008)). 
The  consensus  of  authors  is  that  the  pecking  order  and  tradeoff  theories  have  been  the  
dominant theories in capital structure and only the improved understanding of the dynamic 
aspects of capital structure have made the theories less compelling.  
 
The  tradeoff  theory’s  weaknesses  have  stimulated  a  number  of  authors  to  aim  to  better  
account for firms’ actual capital structure policies in their theoretical capital structure 
frameworks. In response to the traditional static tradeoff theory, Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner 
(1989) and Lucas and McDonald (1990) discuss an alternative version of capital structure 
theory, dynamic tradeoff theory. According to the dynamic tradeoff theory, firms can deviate 
from their optimal capital structure to the extent that the transaction costs of capital structure 
adjustment outweigh the costs of deviating from optimal structure. Fama and French (2002), 
however, point out that firms are fairly slowly adjusting their capital structures, which suggest 
that suboptimal capital structures can exist for long periods of time. On the contrary, Leary 
and Roberts (2005) claim that firms actively adjust their leverage towards target. 
 
Market timing theory of the capital structure is a novel alternative for the predominant 
theories. To clarify, the empirical evidence on security issuance has documented firms to 
issue equity when their market prices are high and repurchase shares when low. Hovakimian 
et al. (2001) While market timing of equity issuers is fairly old and approved phenomenon, 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that the impact of firms’ security issuance market timing on 
observed capital structures is persistent. Consequently firms’ capital structures are cumulative 
outcomes of their past market values. Baker and Wurgler (2002) use market-to-book as the 
measure of firm valuation level and conclude that if no single optimal capital structure exist, 
then managers do not need to reverse the market timing decisions when firm’s market-to-
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book shifts back to a lower level. Therefore, historical market timing can be a determinant of 
the current capital structure.  
 
Hovakimian (2006) questions the findings of Baker and Wurgler as he finds no significance 
evidence of market timing pattern for debt issues and debt reductions. In addition, the equity 
market timing does not seem to have a long-lasting impact on firms’ capital structures. Or to 
be more precise, the relation between market-to-book and capital structure does not imply 
such an impact to exist, contrary to Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) findings. Hovakimian (2006) 
also finds that the market-to-book ratios of equity issuers are significantly higher than debt 
issuers during all the years in his sample. The finding suggests that the negative effect of 
market-to-book on leverage seems to be cross-sectional rather than time-series phenomenon 
and more likely to reflect changes in growth opportunities than market timing. Kayhan and 
Titman (2007) and Leary and Roberts (2005), on the other hand, argue that firms actually 
rebalance their capital structures towards a target, while Fama and French (2002) and Huang 
and Ritter (2009) show that rebalancing occurs fairly slowly and therefore, the shocks in the 
market values have long-lived influence on observed capital structures. Nevertheless, the role 
of market timing on firms’ observed capital structures remains somewhat unsettled issue in 
corporate finance literature. 
 
2.2 Empirical evidence on determinants of SEOs 
In  this  section,  I  present  the  various  theories  proposed  to  motivate  firms  to  issue  seasoned  
equity. The aggregate volume of equity issues, or the equity issue cycles, has been examined 
by numerous authors. Majority of the existing literature positions itself with a single 
explanation for the fluctuation in volumes. The literature on most often argued explanations 
for the fluctuation in equity issuance activity (market timing, demand for capital, information 
asymmetry and to a lesser extent investor sentiment) is summarized in the following 
subsections.  IPO cycles  tend  to  fluctuate  together  with  SEO cycles,  yet  in  the  case  of  IPOs 
more dramatic shifts between hot and cold cycles occur. Due to the obvious conformity in 
IPO and SEO determinants,  I  summarize also some of the main theories on IPO cycles that 
have relevance for SEOs. 
2.2.1 Market timing 
Several perspectives have been taken to justify the market timing hypothesis in equity 
issuance. Marsh (1982) studies a sample of UK firms facing equity vs. debt decision. He finds 
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that firms’ decisions are heavily influenced by past securities prices and current market 
conditions as well as target leverage levels. Lucas and McDonald (1990) state that equity 
issues seldom take place when management sees firm’s equity being undervalued. Jung et al. 
(1996) show equity issuing firms experiencing positive abnormal 11-month returns before the 
issue. Moreover, higher equity issue volumes occur at times of high recent stock market 
performance, and are often aligned with rising economic activity. Finally, Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) find that firms with high past stock returns are likely to issue equity and retire debt, 
while firms with low past stock market performance are reluctant to issue equity. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2000) investigate the time series variation of equity issues’ share in total 
new capital issues and find that the peaks in equity issue volume occur at times of high past 
aggregate market values, just before periods of low market returns. They claim that the strong 
presence of market timing by managers violates the efficient market hypothesis. The authors 
additionally argue that the equity share in new issues is an efficient predictor of one-year-
ahead market returns. Baker and Wurgler (2002) elaborate four sources of distinct evidence 
for market timing of equity issues: Firstly, actual financing decisions by firms tend to be 
dominated by equity issues at times of high market values and debt issues when market values 
are low. Secondly, analyses of post-issue performance (see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
and Spiess, Afflec-Graves (1995)) reveals successful market timing due to low post-issue 
returns. Third, analyses of earnings forecasts and realizations show that equity issues tend to 
occur when investors in general are over-optimistic about firms’ prospects. Finally, survey by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) reveals CFOs to exploit high market values by issuing equity. 
 
Despite the obvious presence of market timing as a factor affecting the SEO decision, the 
market timing hypothesis has continued to be a widely examined phenomenon. A new area of 
studies aims to better understand the role of market timing in equity issuance. Dittmar and 
Thakor (2007) state that the managers are likely to issue equity at times of high past stock 
returns  provided  that  shareholders’  views  on  the  project  payoff  are  aligned  with  the  
management. Moreover, managers want the likelihood of agreement with investors to be as 
large as possible, otherwise firms prefer issuing debt. Alti and Sulaeman (2008) investigate 
the link between institutional demand and market timing. Moreover, their findings indicate 
that high past stock returns lead to an increased likelihood of equity issue only when the firm 
contemporaneously faces high institutional demand. 
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Hot issue markets in IPOs have been studied extensively. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) define hot 
issue markets as periods where new issues constantly earn remarkable abnormal returns 
during the first month after listing, and conclude that such returns could be predictable and 
provide investors with high returns.  Lowry and Schwert (2002) find that there is a strong 
relation between IPO initial returns and the following number of IPOs. The authors claim that 
similar firms tend to conduct an IPO at about the same time. Furthermore, the deal specific 
information on the IPO during registration period becomes gradually public, and has an 
impact on other firms’ pricing and decisions to go public, which implies that market timing 
and benchmarking of peers jointly lead into a high IPO volume and a reduction in the 
probability of a deal failure. Ritter and Welch (2002), on the other hand, claim that IPOs tend 
to occur at times of higher aggregate market values. Lowry (2003) studies fluctuation in 
economy-wide IPO volume and finds that stock market variables are strongly related to 
number of IPOs. Namely, various combinations of market-to-book and stock returns have 
significant impact on the number of IPOs. Finally, Pastor and Veronesi (2005) conclude that 
IPO waves tend to occur after periods of high market returns and to be followed by fairly low 
returns. 
2.1.2 Investment related demand for capital 
Traditional pecking order theory implies that adverse selection problem is likely to be large 
when firms do not have promising investment opportunities. Further, cost of issuing equity 
picks up when the lemons problem, making a distinction between good and bad investment 
project, grows in importance. In general, the adverse selection problem is material when the 
economy is in downturn, and according to pecking order theory, firms should prefer using 
internal capital or issuing risk-free debt. Therefore, the general level of demand for capital can 
be seen as a possible determinant on the equity issue decision. (Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Choe et al. (1993)) 
 
Choe et al. (1993) examine time series predictions on the determinants of equity issues and 
the impact of issuer characteristics on the announcement returns. Accordingly, equity issues 
occur at times when adverse selection costs are at their lowest. The low adverse selection cost 
periods are likely to occur when economy is booming and firms have promising investment 
opportunities. Choe et al. (1993) report evidence supporting the adverse selection hypothesis 
and conclude that the equity share in all new issues increases in expansionary business cycles. 
In addition, when the impact of business cycle variables are correctly controlled, neither past 
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stock returns nor interest rates is found to be significantly related to equity issuance. In other 
words, they argue that the impact of business cycle variables actually causes the linkage 
between the proven strong impact of stock market variables on equity issuance. 
 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) find that hot SEO market issuers have high demand for capital 
and therefore, issuing equity seems well motivated from the investors’ perspective. Similarly, 
Lowry (2003) studies the fluctuation in the IPO volume by means of aggregate and industry 
level time-series regressions. Her findings indicate that both demand for capital and investor 
sentiment are important factors contributing to the number of IPOs. Furthermore, when 
demand for capital increases, a rise in IPO volume is likely to occur and similarly, ceteris 
paribus, firms tend to go public when investor sentiment is high. Finally, Brau, Ryan, and 
DeGraw (2006) investigate the link between the financial theories and CFO perceptions of 
IPO firms’. The survey reveals that demand for capital and future access to seasoned equity 
motivates firms to go public. 
2.1.3 Asymmetry of information  
In response to the static tradeoff theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) argue 
that asymmetric information plays a key role in firms’ capital issuance decisions. Moreover, 
asymmetric information pushes firms to follow the financing pecking order, according to 
which internally generated capital is always preferred to external capital and debt preferred to 
equity. Namely, the information asymmetry of debt capital is less detrimental as opposed to 
the equity. However, empirical evidence to support the time-varying asymmetric information 
costs as the explanation for the existence of equity cycles is quite limited, yet some authors 
point to its direction as the primary SEO determinant. 
 
According to Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), firms could see periods of low asymmetric 
information as a window of opportunity to issue equity. They define window of opportunity 
to exist when the information asymmetry is at historically low level in the whole economy. In 
such periods firms are able to signal their value and intent to investors more precisely. One 
such signal could be an intensive capital expenditure program, in which case the investors 
could easily verify firm’s need for capital, and make a distinction from a situation where the 
main motivation to issue equity is purely opportunistic stock overvaluation. In these 
circumstances, demand for capital and information asymmetry hypotheses partly overlap and 
it can be impossible to completely distinguish between the consequences of each of them. The 
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authors further report that investors respond differently to the firm characteristics of equity 
issuers in hot and cold markets and conclude it as an indirect evidence of information 
asymmetry playing a role in equity issuance. Namely, investors pay more attention to 
variables of firm quality and future prospects, such as market-to-book ratio, during the cold 
periods. 
 
Dierkens (1991) studies the information asymmetry between managers and investors and its 
implications on equity issuance. She builds on the assumption that managers have superior 
information on firm specific events which in turn creates information asymmetry. Moreover, 
the problem of asymmetric information rises in importance every time the firm seeks external 
funding from the capital markets. The hypothesized proxies of information asymmetry are the 
stock market reaction to earnings announcements, residual variance of the stock returns, 
intensity of public announcements and intensity of trading. Dierkens (1991) concludes that 
the proxies of information asymmetry are significantly related to the announcement effect and 
timing of SEOs. Choe et al. (1996), on the other hand, find that stock price run-up and low 
stock return volatility are both determinants of high equity issue activity and conclude that 
those variables reflect decreased information asymmetry.  
 
The first studies on the role of information asymmetry in equity issuance concentrate on the 
economy-wide relations. To better understand the impact of information asymmetry on 
security issue decision at the cross section, a new arm of studies investigates the impacts of 
temporal variation in firm-specific information asymmetry. D’mello and Ferris (2000) report 
negative relation between analysts’ forecast dispersion and the SEO announcement return. 
Their findings imply that firms with less uncertainty for future prospects are better off when 
issuing equity as opposed to the firms with larger uncertainty. Autore and Kovacs (2009) 
hypothesize that the firms having severe information discrepancy between management and 
investors in general are likely to time the equity issues for periods of lower discrepancy. They 
find cross-sectional measures of information asymmetry to be strongly linked to the equity 
issuance, lower information asymmetry implying an increased likelihood of equity issue 
decision. Moreover, further tests reveal that the results are not monotonic by nature, but 
instead driven by a subsample of firms having high information asymmetry in general. Those 
firms exploit periods of low asymmetry to conduct an SEO. Finally, Lee and Masulis (2009) 
use the quality of accounting information as a proxy for information asymmetry. Low 
accounting information quality theoretically could increase the discrepancy between company 
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insiders and investors. Namely, insiders know the quality of the firm despite the quality of 
reporting, while investors’ perceptions on the firm are guided by the accounting information. 
They conclude that the firms with poor accounting information content face larger issue costs 
and more negative SEO announcement effects than firms of good information quality. 
 
Walker and Yost (2008) study the determinants of SEO decision and the use of proceeds. 
They find that regardless of what firms say, they are likely to increase capital  expenditures,  
research and development expenditure and long-term borrowing after the issue. Interestingly, 
the authors find that if the firm provides specific plans for the uses of proceeds, investors are 
more optimistic (less negative) around the SEO announcement. Moreover, investors value 
marginal dollar in a firm more if managers do not have excess cash and large discretion over 
the uses of funds. Their findings indicate that asymmetric information between management 
and shareholders, the principal-agent problem, is an essential component of the SEO decision 
and a determinant of the stock performance around the announcement of the issue. 
 
Dittmar and Thakor (2007) suggest a model of equity issuance building on both market timing 
and information asymmetry arguments. The empirical investigation of the hypothesized 
model yields the following results: First, firms issue equity after increases in stock prices. 
Second, firms also issue equity when proxies on managers’ and equityholders’ perceptions on 
the firm prospects are aligned regardless of the stock performance. Finally, they conclude that 
the agreement between shareholders and management has explanatory power in SEO decision 
even after controlling for the level of stock returns. Dittmar and Thakor (2007) therefore 
combine  two  among  the  most  influential  theories  of  equity  issuance  and  show  that  the  
determinants of SEOs have not yet been fully explored. 
2.1.4 Investor sentiment 
A more recent area of interest in behavioral corporate finance addresses the impacts of 
investor sentiment in the stock market. To date, investor sentiment has been found to be 
present in the contemporaneous stock returns, and also to some degree, have predictive power 
in the future aggregate stock returns (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, (2006) and (2007), Fisher 
and Statman, (2000)). Growing body of research takes either “irrational investors approach” 
or “irrational managers approach” and explain some aspects of the behavioral corporate 
finance from either one of the two perspectives (Baker, Ruback and Wurgler, 2005). The 
evolution of studies about the role of investor sentiment has evolved over time and according 
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to Baker et al. (2005), the question no longer is whether investor sentiment is present, but 
merely, how to measure it and to quantify its influences.  
 
Lowry (2003) studies macro level determinants of IPOs and suggests that over-optimism 
among small investors implies a greater likelihood to participate in an equity offering. 
Knowing the general level of investor sentiment in the economy, firms could exploit 
fluctuations in sentiment to time the equity offerings for periods of high sentiment. Lowry 
(2003), using data on closed-end-fund discounts, finds investor sentiment to be an important 
determinant of IPO volume. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) propose an alternative 
theory on IPO issuance in which sentiment investors’ demand play a crucial role. Further, 
sentiment investors’ demand provides regular investors with exit opportunities and guarantees 
that regular investors are interested in getting an allocation in new issues, if those are 
underpriced on average. Underpricing compensates the regular investors for bearing the risk 
of a rapid decline in investor sentiment, which can lead to sentiment investors vanishing from 
the market. The theory of Ljungqvist et al. (2006) is consistent with both underpricing of 
IPOs and the role of investor sentiment as an equity issue determinant.  
2.1.5 Firm specific issuer characteristics 
This subsection pools together the key firm characteristics that relate to the likelihood of 
equity  issue  decision.  Along with  the  four  distinct  hypotheses  on  the  determinants  of  SEOs 
presented in the previous subsections, an SEO decision strongly relates to certain firm-
specific factors. According to Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) a typical equity issue type firm 
experiences less negative abnormal returns around the announcement as opposed to a firm 
with typical debt issuer characteristics when issuing seasoned equity. Moreover, the authors 
claim that the characteristics closely related to the increased likelihood of an equity issue, or 
being an equity issue type firm, are low financial flexibility (cash flow over all positive NPV 
investments),  high  recent  stock  price  performance,  low  tax  benefit  of  debt,  high  costs  of  
financial distress and small firm size. Similarly Rajan and Zingales (1995) identify a set of 
variables that are closely related to the firm leverage: market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, 
firm size and profitability. DeAngelo et al. (2007) and Leary and Roberts (2005) point out 
that equity issuing firms are often financially constrained. They use Altman’s Z-score to 
capture the effect of missing financial flexibility.2 Finally, Jenter (2005) finds that seasoned 
                                               
2 Leary and Roberts (2005) specify Altman’s Z-score as the sum of 3.3 times earnings before interest and taxes 
plus sales plus 1.4 retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital, all divided by total assets. 
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equity offerings coincide with insider selling. His findings are consistent with market timing 
based theories on equity issuance according to which the management holds information that 
investors do not have. 
 
Dittmar and Thakor (2007) discuss the control variables to be used in the tests of firm 
financial policy. They state that in order to distinct between consequences of pecking order 
and tradeoff theory, a certain set of control variables should be included in the analysis of the 
financial policy. Moreover, larger firms have lower costs of debt and therefore, natural 
logarithm of sales should be included as a control variable. Dittmar and Thakor (2007) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that profitable firms often have higher agency costs 
associated with debt, and thus return on assets should be used as a control variable. Also, 
financial slack, defined as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets, implies lower 
need for external financing. Firms with research and development expenditures have higher 
agency costs of debt and should prefer equity over debt. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also point 
out that firms with high tangibility of assets, measured as property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets, are more likely to issue debt. Finally, based on the tradeoff theory of 
capital structure, firms with high leverage prefer issuing equity due to the increased level of 
marginal costs of debt. 
 
2.3 Empirical evidence on the stock market performance of the SEO firms 
Equity issuers’ stock market performance has been studied extensively in the recent literature. 
Various authors have reported stock price run-ups before offering, negative returns during a 
short window around the announcement and finally, weak performance in the long-term 
following an offering. In this chapter, I will highlight the most influential literature on 
announcement effect, long-term performance and the theories explaining the observed market 
reactions. 
 
UK equity market has several distinct characteristics from an equity issuer’s perspective, 
which should be noted when analyzing the empirical results. First, the predominant issue 
method in  the  US is  cash  offerings,  whereas  in  the  UK,  rights  offerings  remained  the  usual  
floatation method choice in SEOs for a long time. Moreover, the rights offerings protect 
shareholders from diluting their ownership in the firm and thus, enable maintaining the voting 
rights in the firm regardless of the equity issue. Slovin et al. (2000) concludes that the use of 
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insured rights offerings exposes the firm for larger adverse selection costs, as the underwriting 
provided by the third party reveals management concerns regarding a negative stock price 
performance preceding the decided issue date. Recent studies by Andrikopoulos (2009) and 
Barnes and Walker (2006) show that the use of rights issues has lessened since the mid-1990s 
to the detriment of other floatation methods’ increasing popularity. Furthermore, the event 
data sample covering period 1999-2007 that I employ in the thesis contains only 6.1 % of 
rights offerings. Second, while both US and UK corporate governance systems are considered 
as Anglo-American type, some differences exist that can have implications for the equity 
issues. Namely, the UK institutional investors own some 84.7 % (2004) of the total market 
capitalization, while the similar figure for US amounts to 58.0 % (2002) and additionally, the 
US CEOs have much higher discretion concerning the firm’s decision making. UK 
institutional ownership is concentrated to the hands of insurance companies and pension 
funds, both of which are characterized as long-term oriented patient capital as opposed to the 
mutual funds and investment advisors controlling for the majority of US institutional 
ownership. (Aquilera, Williams, Conley and Rupp, 2006) 
2.3.1 Announcement effect 
This subsection pools together the main literature from the area of seasoned equity issuers’ 
abnormal announcement returns.3 According to the efficient market hypothesis, an 
announcement that does not reveal information on changes in the firm’s cash flow should not 
stimulate stock price changes. Yet, various theories exist to explain why negative 
announcement effect of SEOs takes place. On one hand, a new equity issue can decrease 
firm’s  leverage  and  weaken  the  tax  advantages  of  debt,  and  on  the  other  hand,  an  
unanticipated equity issue makes firm’s debt safer implying a wealth transfer from 
equityholders to debtholders. As already stated in the previous section, the managements’ 
decision to issue equity reflects information on the firm’s intrinsic value. Changes in capital 
structure of a firm reveal also information regarding the management’s perception on the 
firm’s future. Specifically, high leverage is a binding constraint on the firm and signals 
management’s optimism on the firm outlook. Finally, negative announcement effect can 
reflect the considerably large transaction costs of the new issues. (Modigliani and Miller 
(1963), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Ross (1977)) 
                                               
3 Traditionally, the announcement return has been measured during a two-day event window [-1,0] or during a 
three-day event window [-1,+1]. In the empirical analysis I use the latter, but in the literature review I treat them 
equivalently. 
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The literature quantifying the announcement effect of SEO firms has been evolving since 
mid-1980s as Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) reported 
significantly negative announcement effects in the magnitude of -3 % respectively. Asquith 
and Mullins (1986) further state that the observation of negative announcement return can be 
explained by the decrease in tax advantages, if the issue has a lowering impact on firm’s 
leverage ratio. While the tax advantages of debt is an often noted reason for the negative 
announcement effect of SEOs, the predominant explanation for the phenomenon is Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory and its adverse selection implications. Accordingly the 
announcement of SEO reveals information on management’s perception on the firm’s 
intrinsic value, and investors find the information concerning filing an SEO negative. 
Moreover, the management is likely to see firm’s market value to be at a high level relative to 
its intrinsic value. Both Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) report 
more negative announcement returns for industrial firms than for public utility firms. They 
conclude that public utilities firms’ lower negative returns may reflect the lower discretion 
that the management has on timing an SEO. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find a negative 
announcement effect well in line with earlier research. They hypothesize that management’s 
decision to conduct an SEO reveals information for the investors as management would 
cancel the issue if stock turned out to be undervalued at the pre-defined announcement date. 
 
After the first studies to document the negative announcement return on SEOs in the US in 
the mid-1980s, a number of studies have confirmed that the phenomenon still holds. Slovin et 
al. (1994) study a sample of firms issuing seasoned equity after becoming listed in the US. 
They find that the SEO firms have highly concentrated ownership, are reluctant to go to the 
debt market and earn a significantly negative announcement return. Also Dierkens (1991) 
reports an average abnormal return of the similar size, yet highlighting that at times of lower 
asymmetric information the announcement returns are likely to be less negative. According to 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli’s (2007) thorough survey on SEOs, the average negative abnormal 
return on SEOs in the US is some 2.2 % and clearly statistically significant. 
 
A number studies aim to provide a more profound explanation for the negative announcement 
effect of the SEOs. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) study periods of high and low equity 
issuance volume. They find that the SEOs in hot cycles yield negative announcement return 
on average, but issues during cold cycles yield some 130 basis points more negative 
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announcement effects. They suggest that the lower negative returns at times of high issuance 
volume imply lower information asymmetry between managers and investors. Choe et al. 
(1993), on the other hand, state that the negative announcement returns on equity issues are 
smaller when economy is booming and information asymmetry is lower compared to times of 
slow economic activity when more uncertainty in asset prices exist. Walker and Yost (2008) 
divide firms into subsamples based on their intended use of proceeds. While the total sample 
experiences a significantly negative announcement return, the firms that are expected to invest 
the proceeds immediately face on average 50 basis points less negative announcement return.  
 
Table I 
Literature on SEO announcement returns 
 
The table summarizes some of the main findings in the area of SEO announcement effect. All the studies employ 
either [-1,0] or [-1,+1] as the event window. First studies to report the negative announcement effect of SEOs 
were published in 1986 and the body of literature on topic is continuously increasing. 
 
 
 
Table I above pools together the research on SEO announcement returns conducted using US, 
UK and international data respectively. The international evidence on SEOs remained fairly 
narrow for a long time, but has broadened recently. Eckbo et al. (2007) state that there are 
significant country-specific institutional differences, and as opposed to the common practice 
in the US, the rights issues have remained the most often used transaction type in the smaller 
economies. In many of the smaller countries, the reported announcement returns have been 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) 392 1963–81 US -3.00%
Masulis and Korwar (1986) 972 1963–80 US -3.30%
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 80 1972–82 US -3.56%
Dierkens (1991) 197 1980-83 US -2.40%
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 1,057 1963–80 US -2.00%
Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) 1,456 1963-83 US -3.15%a
Denis (1994) 435 1977–90 US -2.49%
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) 1,884 1968–90 US -2.65%b
Bethel and Krigman (2004) 2,592 1992-01 US -2.01%
Heron and Lie (2004) 3,658 1980–98 US -2.50%
Burton, Lonie and Power (2000) 37 1989-91 UK -7.76%c
Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000) 296 1986-94 UK -1.44%d
Barnes and Walker (2006) 868 1989-98 UK -0.33%d
Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen (1997) 114 1980-93 Norway -0.23%
Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) 215 1986-96 France -0.80%
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) 199 1986-99 Sweden 5.43%d
Wu, Wang, and Yao (2005) 405 1989-97 Hong Kong 1.94%d
Quynh-Nhu (2009) 82 1996-03 Finland -3.60 %
a abnormal return for industrial firms only, b equally weighted average between hot and cold markets, 
c sample containing only standby rights offerings, d equally weighted average between all issue types
Abnormal return  Author(s) Sample size Sample period Market
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neutral or slightly positive on average. However, the floatation method choice plays a 
significant role in explaining the announcement returns of the issuers. In the UK, Slovin et al. 
(2000) investigate a small sample (20) of uninsured rights offerings and find significantly 
negative announcement return. They also report negative announcement effect for standby 
rights offerings and positive for private placements respectively.4 Barnes and Walker (2006) 
divide the UK SEOs into rights offerings and placings and analyze the impact of issue method 
on announcement effect. Their findings indicate that while rights offerings face slightly 
negative announcement effect, placings experience positive, but statistically insignificant 
market reaction. Moreover, the positive returns around the announcement of private 
placements  have  been  verified  also  in  the  US market  as  Eckbo et  al.  (2007)  summarize  the  
existing literature on private placements and conclude that various authors report positive 
returns. Burton, Lonie and Power (2000) and Burton, Helliar and Power (2003) find that the 
negative announcement returns in the UK are driven by rights issues, while public offerings 
face neutral market reaction during the announcement window.  
2.3.2 Long-term underperformance 
Most of the studies on SEOs’ stock market dynamics report positive stock market run-up 
before the issue. While the positive pre-issue stock market performance has been known and 
accepted for long a period of time, it was not until mid-1990s when Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) present post-issue underperformance of seasoned equity issues. A typical SEO firm 
during the period 1970-90 provides only an average annual return of 7 % over the five years 
subsequent to the issue. Loughran and Ritter’s (1995) findings are economically significant as 
an investor should have invested 44 % more capital to issuers as opposed to non-issuers to 
achieve the same return. Similarly to Loughran and Ritter, Spiess and Afflec-Graves (1995) 
examine the post-issue performance of firms filing an SEO, and find robust underperformance 
of SEOs firms after controlling for size, book-to-market and company age. They also suggest 
two distinct explanations for the observed results: First, the significant underperformance in 
the long-term could be a result of successful market timing by the management. Second, the 
underperformance can stem from the decrease in firms’ risk and simply not be anomalous at 
all as firms with lower risk are expected to yield lower returns. The findings of Loughran and 
                                               
4Uninsured rights offering refers to an equity issue where the existing shareholders are offered a preference over 
the new investors. In a standby rights offering a financial advisor, typically an investment bank, guarantees the 
risk of being able to sell all the issued shares to the market. Private placement as opposed to public offering 
refers to an equity issue in which certain investor or a group of investors subscribes all the issued shares and no 
shares are being offered to the public. 
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Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afflec-Graves (1995) are striking in the sense that they challenge 
efficient market hypothesis and motivates the development of behavioral asset pricing 
models. Finally, the existing literature on the UK post-issue stock market performance reports 
an average annual underperformance of approximately 5 %, which is well in line with the 
evidence from the US. 
 
Numerous researches have criticized the findings and questioned their robustness. After the 
“new issues puzzle”, the underperformance of equity issuers following an issue, was 
presented, a number of authors have questioned the robustness of the phenomenon. Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000) and Brav, Greczy, and Gombers (2000) state that the underperformance 
of new issues stems from model misspecification, and is attributable to the wrong benchmarks 
used. Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) are of the same opinion and explain that when firms 
issue equity, they lower the company specific default risk and therefore, should provide a 
lower  return  on  equity.  In  addition,  they  suggest  that  as  an  SEO  significantly  increases  the  
liquidity of the stock, it further lowers the issuer’s expected return and consequnetly, the 
matching firm or portfolio becomes less suitable for comparing the post-issue returns. Eckbo 
et al. (2000) conclude that the new issues puzzle is a result of matching firm technique’s 
inability to adjust for company specific risk. Fama (1998) questions the long-term post-issue 
underperformance and suggests that long-term anomalies are extremely sensitive to the 
selected methodology. Moreover, the assumptions on normal returns and statistical 
approaches on measuring them can be responsible for the anomaly. Fama (1998) assumes the 
high returns prior to the issue to reflect high earnings and he explains that if investors do not 
fully understand that earnings will mean-revert in the long-run, the investors only gradually 
react in the long-run, and consequently the firm underperforms following an SEO. Finally, 
Fama (1998) concludes that if an anomaly disappears when different methodology is used to 
detect it, and all studies replicate the robustness tests employed by the first studies in the 
subject, the anomaly as such can be an illusion.  
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Table II 
Literature on SEO post-issue underperformance using BHAR methodology 
 
The table summarizes the main findings in the area of SEO post-issue underperformance. Two of the most often 
used methodologies for detecting abnormal returns in the long-term event studies are buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) and calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns using either Fama-French three-factor model or 
some of the applied versions of factor models. The table pools together only the studies that measure the 
abnormal returns using BHAR methodology and employing either matching firm or portfolio as the benchmark 
for normal returns. The first studies on topic were published in 1995 and the SEO post-issue underperformance 
continues to be a widely examined topic in the corporate finance literature. 
 
 
 
Despite the criticisms, a large number authors report statistically significant long-term 
underperformance. Table II above presents the most influential findings in the area of 
seasoned equity issuers’ post-issue underperformance. Results are somewhat sensitive to the 
model specification, two of the most often employed being buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
and calendar-time abnormal returns. In different studies, the abnormal underperformance has 
varied  between  0  %  and  60  %  over  the  estimation  period,  while  the  typical  annual  
underperformance has settled between 5 % and 10 %. Yet, the low stock market performance 
of equity issuing firms seems to remain an unsettled issue in the corporate finance literature. 
 
Besides market timing theory of equity issuance, the deterioration in SEO firms’ post-issue 
performance is able explain why issuers on average underperform to their non-issuing 
benchmarks. One such theory, consistent with information asymmetry arguments on equity 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) 3,702 1970-90 US 36 months -33.0%
Loughran and Ritter (1995) 3,702 1970-90 US 60 months -59.4%
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) 1,247 1975-89 US 36 months -22.8%
Jegadeesh (2000) 2,992 1970-93 US 60 months -34.3%
Brav, Geczy and Gombers (2000) 3,775 1975-92 US 60 months -26.3%
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) 3,851 1964-95 US 60 months -23.2%
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2007) 4,971 1980-00 US 60 months -29.7%a
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2007) 655 1980-00 US 60 months 0.0%b
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2007) 659 1980-00 US 60 months -19.1%c
Suzuki (2000) 826 1991-96 UK 18 months -15.1%
Ho (2005) 627 1989-97 UK 36 months -19.5%
Ngatuni, Capstaff and Marshall (2007) 818 1986-95 UK 60 months -32.1%
Andrikopoulos (2009) 1,542 1988-98 UK 36 months -26.2%
Cai and Loughran (1998) 1,389 1971-92 Japan 60 months -41.7%
Jeanneret (2005) 336 1982-97 France 36 months -44.4%d
Jeanneret (2005) 43 1982-97 France 36 monhts -17.2%e
a abnormal return for industrial firms only, b abnormal return for financial firms only, 
c abnormal return for utilities firms only, d rights offerings, e public offerings
BHAR  Author(s) Sample size
Sample 
period
Market
Holding 
period
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issuance, is the deterioration of operative performance following an issue. Accordingly, 
managers can manipulate firm accounting information leading into a bias in investors’ 
expectations on the firm prospects. The weakening of operating performance over long-
horizon after the SEOs gradually narrows information asymmetry between managers and 
investors resulting into a revision of valuations and post-issue underperformance. Loughran 
and Ritter (1997) find that firms’ operative performance improves sharply before an SEO and 
causes a run-up in the stock price. However, the operative performance of the issuers starts to 
deteriorate soon after the issue and results in poor long-term stock returns. Andrikopoulos 
(2009) studies the determinants of long-term underperformance using a sample of UK equity 
issuers. He uses various indicators of operating performance, for instance return on assets 
(ROA) and net profit margin, and concludes that firms’ performance sharply declines 
immediately after the SEO and continues to deteriorate for up to three years following an 
SEO. 
  
Due to the partial inability of some of the existing theories to explain the stock price 
mechanism around the SEOs, Carlson, Fischer, and Giammarino (2006) present a theory 
utilizing real-option framework. According to Carlson et al. (2005, 2006), firms issue equity 
when they grow in size and end up using the proceeds to convert real-options into assets in 
place. Even if the assets are risky in general, they are less risky than the real options held by 
the firms, and the reduced risk explains long-term underperformance documented by 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and others. The real-option framework by Carlson et al. (2006) 
actually comes close to the arguments of Eckbo et al. (2000), according to which equity issues 
generally  decrease  firm  default  risk.  Namely,  the  common  factor  explaining  the  poor  long-
term performance in both cases is the reduction in risk due to capital flow in fixed assets. The 
theory of Carlson et al. (2005, 2006) can explain also pre-issue stock price run-up, as firms 
only convert options into assets when the options move significantly in the money. The stock 
price run-up thus is a result of firm’s real-options moving from out of the money to in the 
money. The theory assumes that the projects become as real-options, since they are flexible in 
time  and  additionally,  managers  can  delay  and  time  the  projects  for  the  periods  when  they  
yield the highest possible return. Interestingly, while market timing theory assumes managers’ 
ability to time the market to lead into low post-issue returns, the real-option theory presented 
by  Carlsson  et  al.  (2006)  assumes  that  lower  future  returns  stem from lower  risk  after  SEO 
proceeds are converted from real-options into assets.  
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Besides the real-option framework, by Carlson et al. (2006), a few other studies point out the 
importance of investment opportunities in explaining the post-issue performance. Autore, 
Bray and Peterson (2009) analyze the role of use of proceeds in SEO returns and report results 
that indicate investment purposes to be the only category with insignificant abnormal 
underperformance. Moreover, emplying BHAR and factor-models, they conclude that all the 
other use of proceed classes significantly underperform in the long-term. Lyandres, Sun and 
Zhang (2008) study post-issue returns and agree that the presence of investment opportunities 
actually explains the majority of the abnormal stock price performance. 
 
Schulz (2003) presents an alternative theory, pseudo market timing, to explain poor long-term 
stock  performance  following  an  SEO.  He  argues  that  most  of  the  SEOs  occur  after  stock  
market has been bullish in general, since issues often take place during the hot cycles, which 
occur when the stock market is at a high level. After the stock price run-ups, the future returns 
are likely to be lower. Therefore, majority of the seasoned equity offerings are likely to 
perform poorly and the managements’ market timing does not account for the phenomenon. 
Schulz (2003) suggests that calendar-time portfolio approach to eliminate the impact of time 
and fluctuating stock market, which however, is not problem-free according to Jegadeesh 
(2000).  
 
3 HYPOTHESES 
 
This  section  will  present  the  hypotheses  that  are  tested  in  the  study.  The  hypotheses  are  
mainly based on the existing literature presented in Chapter 2. I will first motivate and posit 
the hypotheses on the macro determinants of equity issues. Secondly, I will posit the 
hypotheses on the micro level determinants of SEOs, put differently the factors that can 
explain why some firms choose to issue equity and others debt. Finally, I pose hypotheses on 
the abnormal returns during the announcement period and in the post-issue period. All the 
hypotheses are pooled into a table III at the end of the chapter. 
 
3.1  Macro level determinants of SEOs 
The various hypotheses for equity issue determinants presented in the literature are partly 
overlapping. Namely, firms tend to issue equity when stock prices are high, which is also 
likely to occur simultaneously with rising economic activity and profitable invest 
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opportunities. Furthermore, at those time periods, information asymmetry can be fairly low as 
investors know that the management faces promising investment opportunities. Investor 
sentiment can also be inflated by the recent stock market run-up. Despite the partial overlap in 
different equity issue determinant theories, I test the following hypotheses separately making 
an effort to pick well specified proxies. 
 
Vast majority of the studies on SEOs document that equity issues are likely to occur at times 
of high market valuation levels. In addition, Graham and Harvey (2001) survey CEOs 
motivations for SEOs and find that market timing is one of the key reasons for firms to 
conduct an SEO. Baker and Wurgler (2002) hypothesize that firms issue equity to time the 
market and utilize irrational investors’ inability to adjust their valuations following a stock 
market run-up. Following prior literature, I choose aggregate median market-to-book of all 
listed UK firms and 12-month past raw stock market return on FTSE All-Share index as the 
macro level market timing proxies. On the contrary, as Baker and Wurgler (2000) state that 
high SEO volume periods tend to occur just before stock market crashes, I include future 12-
month raw return on stock market index as an additional market timing proxy. 
H1. Macro volume of SEOs increases with market timing. 
Following Lowry (2003), I hypothesize that adverse selection cost of issuing equity fluctuates 
over time. Moreover, information asymmetry between managers and the equityholders of the 
firm forces managers to issue equity when the adverse selection costs are minimized and 
management’s and investors’ opinions aligned. Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
show that adverse selection forces firms to reject positive NPV projects, if financing cannot 
be arranged at favorable terms.  Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) and Dierkens (1991) find that 
equity issues tend to cluster in periods with smaller average announcement effects. 
Furthermore, those periods are negatively correlated with the measures of information 
asymmetry. According to Dittmar and Thakor (2007), management wishes to issue equity if 
investors’ perceptions on the upcoming investment projects are aligned with the management. 
In other words, management wants the information asymmetry to be minimized before 
committing an SEO. I choose the aggregated standard deviation of analysts’ recommendations 
on the FTSE 100 constituents and daily market volatility within a quarter as the macro level 
information asymmetry proxies. Furthermore, when analysts’ opinions on the firm value are 
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aligned and stock market index is behaving steadily, I hypothesize more firms to conduct an 
SEO. 
H2. Macro volume of SEOs decreases with asymmetric information. 
Firms face higher demand for capital, when they have promising investment projects 
available. In general, upward business cycles tend to provide firms with better investment 
opportunities.  Choe et al. (1993) investigate the impact of the business cycles on firms’ 
decision to issue equity. They find firms’ demand for capital to be highest at times of 
favorable economic conditions – firms are likely to have promising positive NPV investment 
projects when the economy is booming and investors are willing to invest new equity in the 
firms. Following Lowry (2003), I choose GDP growth, average sales growth among all the 
public firms and average interest rate within a quarter as the macro level demand for capital 
proxies. GDP growth measures the aggregate state of the economy, while firms’ sales growth 
should theoretically be followed by higher need for investment to support the growth. Finally, 
investment projects’ NPVs are likely to be positive when discount rates are low. 
H3. Macro volume of SEOs increases with demand for capital. 
Lowry (2003) finds investor sentiment to be a strong determinant of the IPO volume. In 
addition, she states that during some periods, investors are overly optimistic and willing to 
pay more for firms than they are actually worth. As SEOs are clustered for high volume 
cycles,  I  hypothesize  that  investor  sentiment  is  also  a  determinant  of  the  SEO volume.  Qiu  
and Welch (2005) discuss the strengths of various investor sentiment proxies and conclude 
that consumer confidence correlates strongly with actual investor sentiment and has additional 
theoretically sound characters, such as the ability to explain small-firm return spread and 
closed-end-fund IPO activity. Therefore, I choose consumer sentiment index as the investor 
sentiment proxy at the macro level. 
H4. Macro volume of SEOs increases with investor sentiment. 
 
3.2 Micro level determinants of SEOs 
In the micro level determinant hypotheses, I refer solely to the firm specific characteristics to 
distinct between equity issue type firms and debt issue type firms. Similarly to macro 
determinant level, I hypothesize that equity issuers at micro level, are motivated by market 
timing to issue equity. I test whether the equity issuers have experienced higher 12-month raw 
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stock returns, have higher market-to-book ratios and have lower future 12-month raw stock 
returns in comparison to debt issuers. 
H5. The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt issue increases with market timing. 
As already pointed out, pecking order considerations and time-varying adverse selection costs 
suggest that the equity issuing firms are not suffering severely from information asymmetry. I 
assume that the firms who are followed by analysts can communicate their intrinsic value to 
investors more accurately. Therefore I hypothesize that firms followed by the analysts are 
more likely to choose equity financing over debt than companies not followed by analysts. In 
addition, Dittmar and Thakor (2007) point out that low leverage firms are likely to have 
strong growth opportunities and suffer from asymmetric information. Therefore, I hypothesize 
that firm’s leverage is negatively associated with information asymmetry and positively 
associated with the likelihood of an equity issue.  
H6. The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt issue decreases with asymmetric information. 
Building on the framework discussed by Myers (1977) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their 
recent paper, Dittmar and Thakor (2007) note that firms of higher growth opportunities have 
higher agency costs of debt. Therefore, the firms with high demand for capital resulting from 
growth opportunities can prefer issuing equity over debt. I choose sales growth during the 
year of the issue and the level of capital expenditures during the year of the issue divided by 
total  assets  at  the  end  of  previous  year  as  the  proxies  of  firm-specific  demand  for  capital.  
Finally,  the  third  micro  level  demand  for  capital  proxy  is  the  reporting  of  research  and  
development expenditures during the previous year. 
H7. The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt issue increases with demand for capital. 
 
3.3  Issuer stock market performance 
The empirical evidence on SEO announcement effect typically reports a negative stock 
market reaction, but further evidence exists to explain the determinants of announcement 
effect. Bayles and Chaplinsky (1996) find that equity issues at times of high SEO volume 
experience less negative announcement returns than issues during low SEO volume periods. 
However, the less negative market reaction during periods of high SEO volume could be a 
consequence of market timing, information asymmetry, demand for capital or investor 
sentiment. To test the impact of SEO volume, I choose the macro level SEO volume in the 
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issue quarter as the volume proxy to detect whether firms issuing during hot periods undergo 
less negative announcement effect than firms issuing during cold periods. 
H8. SEO announcement return increases with SEO volume. 
Choe et al. (1993) discuss the possibility that the stock market reacts less negatively to SEOs 
during periods of better investment opportunities due to higher demand for capital and lower 
information asymmetry. At the cross-sectional level, Denis (1994) and Burton et al. (2000) 
find some evidence of positive impact of sales growth and other capital demand proxies on 
SEO announcement return. To test the impact of demand for capital on announcement effect, 
I choose firm’s sales growth during the year of the issue as the proxy. 
H9. SEO announcement return increases with demand for capital. 
If firms issue equity to time the market and purely exploit stock price rising above its intrinsic 
value, investors should react to the issue announcement more negatively and adjust their 
valuations toward lower levels. However, agency models predict that companies having high 
past stock returns are likely to face promising future outlook and positive NPV investment 
opportunities. In the described circumstances, equity issues are anticipated and the stock price 
reactions should not reflect negative adverse selection costs, whereas in the case of 
unanticipated equity issues both pecking order and agency models predict that the 
equityholders would be better off if the firm did nothing or issued debt. I test the impact of 
market timing on announcement return using both firm’s past 12-month stock return and the 
level of market-to-book ratio to distinct between firms of high and low market timing.  
H10. SEO announcement return increases with market timing.  
Earlier literature reports statistically and economically significant long-term 
underperformance following an equity issue (see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995), Jegadeesh 
(2000)). Numerous authors explain that long-term underperformance stems from the 
opportunistic activity of managers to time the equity market or alternatively, from 
deterioration of firm’s operative performance. Should the company issue equity due to 
attractive market timing, the post-issue long-term return should be lower than in the case of an 
investment driven SEO. Namely, an investment project as the use of proceeds could alleviate 
the problem of market timing and ensure the funds are put into effective use. Therefore I posit 
the following two mutually non-exclusive hypotheses:  
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H11. SEO long-term underperformance increases with market timing. 
H12. SEO long-term underperformance decreases with demand for capital. 
The presence of market timing attempt suggests that SEOs underperform in general. In the 
case of a larger issue, the underperformance should be higher. More specifically, the firms 
who seek to issue a larger amount of cash than they are able to efficiently spend exploit 
themselves for post-issue underperformance and show signs of managerial hubris. Therefore, 
I hypothesize that larger issues are worse investments than smaller issues in the longer term.  
H13. SEO long-term underperformance increases with deal size. 
 
Table III 
Summary of hypotheses 
 
  
 
4 DATA 
 
This section introduces the data collection process and outlines the final samples. In this 
thesis I investigate the determinants of SEOs from both macro and micro perspectives and the 
Macro determinants of SEOs
H1 Macro volume of SEOs increases with market timing.
H2 Macro volume of SEOs decreases with asymmetric information.
H3 Macro volume of SEOs increases with demand for capital.
H4 Macro volume of SEOs increases with investor sentiment.
Micro determinants of equity issue vs. debt issue choice
H5 The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt issue increases with market timing.
H6 The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt issue decreases with asymmetric information.
H7 The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt issue increases with demand for capital.
Issuer stock market performance
Announcement return
H8
H9
H10
Long-term underperformance
H11
H12
H13
SEO long-term underperformance decreases with demand for capital.
SEO long-term underperformance increases with deal size.
SEO announcement return increases with SEO volume.
SEO announcement return increases with demand for capital.
SEO announcement return increases with market timing.
SEO long-term underperformance increases with market timing.
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performance of SEO firms. As the tests pose distinct requirements for the data, I retrieve data 
for all the three purposes separately and present the sample collection processes and final 
samples accordingly. 
 
4.1  The sample collection process 
4.1.1 Macro level determinants of seasoned equity offerings 
The sample employed in the tests of aggregate issue volume is gathered in the following 
manner. First, I search for seasoned equity offerings by UK firms listed in the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) that took place between Q1 1994 and Q3 2008 from Dealogic database5. I 
further require the deal value to be greater or equal to €5 million to get rid of economically 
insignificant issues and additionally, I require the issue to be a follow-on issue to exclude 
IPOs and convertible issues which are not part of the study. In addition, following Lowry 
(2003), I exclude issues by closed-end-funds, ADRs and REITs. The approach yields total of 
2,670 SEOs taking place during 59 quarters. Secondly, I collect quarterly accounting data 
from Thomson’s Worldscope and data on analyst recommendations from Thomson’s I/B/E/S 
history database. Finally, I retrieve data on the relevant economic fundamentals and stock 
market variables from Datastream. All the stock data employed in the tests of the thesis are 
dividend and stock split adjusted total return index data, and the stock returns are calculated 
as logarithm returns. 
4.1.2 Micro level determinants of seasoned equity offerings 
To examine the likelihood of certain firm characteristics leading into an increased probability 
of an SEO, I  collect  cross-sectional data on equity issuers and debt issuers.  I  begin the data 
collection process by retrieving a list of seasoned equity offerings by UK firms listed in the 
LSE between Q1 1999 and Q3 2007 from Dealogic again requiring that the issue is of a size 
greater than €5 million, the issue to be a follow-on offering, and exclude issues by closed-
end-funds, ADRs and REITs.6  The search yields 1,740 SEOs out of which 1,725 contain an 
ISIN-code. I further exclude issues with only secondary shares sold (494) and firms with no 
stock data available (357). Finally, I restrict firms with no sufficient accounting data available 
(451). I collect data on the control group, the debt issuers, following the procedure used by 
                                               
5 The main advantage of using Dealogic instead of Thomson SDC database or Thomson Deals database is that 
Dealogic reports the announcement dates for equity issues, while the two other sources report only issue dates 
and filing dates. 
6 The beginning of the sample period is limited until 1999, as in prior years the required identification criterion, 
the ISIN-code, is not provided. Correspondingly, I examine the companies’ performance in the long-term and 
require that a minimum of 24-months of stock data exists after the issue. 
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Hovakimian et al. (2001). Further, a company year is classified as debt issuing year if the 
increase in total debt between the beginning and end of the year is at least 10 % of the total 
assets in the beginning of year. I search accounting data and stock data for all the sample 
observations, and additionally for all the firms listed in the LSE during the corresponding 
sample period, to also compare equity issuers to non-issuers.7 I collect annual historical 
accounting data from Thomson’s Worldscope and the total return index stock data from 
Datastream. After excluding observations with no sufficient data available I’m left with a 
final sample of 423 firm years with an SEO and 1,096 firm years with a debt issue. 
4.1.3 Abnormal returns of SEO firms 
To measure the stock market performance of SEO firms around the announcement and in the 
long-term following an issue, I use the same sample of issues as gathered in the previous 
subsection with the exception that the requirements on the data availability are slightly 
loosened and as a result, the event sample consists of 543 SEOs. The sample consists of 289 
SEOs by firms listed in the main-list and 254 SEOs by firms listed in the AIM-list of the 
London Stock Exchange. The required stock data for benchmarking the returns of issuers 
against the value weighted FTSE All-Share market index and matching firms are retrieved 
from Datastream. I assign the matching firms for event firms using the following three-step 
procedure: First, I define all the UK listed firms at the beginning of a given event year that did 
not conduct an SEO during the year. Second, among the chosen firms, I choose all the firms 
having market capitalization between 70 % and 130 % of the event firm’s market 
capitalization as the potential matches. Third, out of the potential matches, I define the firm 
having the most similar market-to-book in comparison to the event firm as the matching firm.  
Finally, I do not require the issuers to remain listed throughout the sample period to avoid 
survival bias. 
 
4.2  Sample characteristics 
In this subsection, I present some of the most relevant properties of the data sample retrieved 
as the outcome of the data collection process explained in the previous subsection. Moreover, 
I plot the time series fluctuation of SEO volume and show the number and value of deals 
qualified in the final sample.  
  
                                               
7 The sample collection process of non-issuer sample is presented in Appendix 1. 
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Panel A. Quarterly number of SEOs and annual total deal value 
 
 
Panel B. Quarterly number of SEOs and scaled volume (SEO%) 
 
Figure 1: SEO volume and value in the UK 1994 – 2008 
Panel A) The figure shows the quarterly distribution of UK SEOs during 1994-2008. The bars plot the number 
of SEOs in the quarter, while the dotted line shows the annual aggregate deal value in €, billion. The data are 
sourced from Dealogic database and includes all the SEOs by UK companies with total deal value exceeding €5 
million. Panel B) The grey bars plot the quarterly number of SEOs and the black line shows the number of SEOs 
divided by the number of UK listed firms in the LSE at the end of the previous year (SEO%). The dotted line 
shows the average SEO% during the 1994-2008 period. 
 
 
The properties of the sample employed in the analysis of the economy-wide determinants of 
SEO volume is presented in Figure 1, which shows that equity issuance volume fluctuates 
both annually and quarterly. The Panel A shows that both volume and value of SEOs possibly 
have upward trend during the 15-year time period and suggests that equity issue market 
activity has increased over time. Furthermore, to mitigate the problem of non-stationarity, I 
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follow similar procedure to Lowry (2003) and divide the volume of SEOs in a quarter by the 
number of listed firms at the end of the previous year to gain market activity adjusted SEO% 
figure.  The  Panel  B  shows  that  Q1  2000  is  an  outlier  observation  –  I  run  regressions  also  
excluding it to account for the possible impact that an outlier could have in estimation of the 
hypothesized relations. 
 
Table IV 
Sample characteristics: macro & micro determinants and issuer stock market performance 
 
Panel A) The table shows the annual deal volume and value (mean) during the period under review 1994-2008 
of the macro determinants sample sourced from Dealogic. The sample consists a total of 2,670 UK SEOs with 
deal value exceeding €5 million. Panel B) The table shows the annual deal volume, value (median) and deal size 
(as a percentage of the previous year end market cap) of equity issues and debt issues of the micro level 
determinants sample. The equity issues are sourced from Dealogic and consist of all UK SEOs with deal value 
exceeding €5 million during period 1999-2007. After retrieving financial data from Thomson’s Worldscope and 
stock data from Datastream, I exclude all the SEOs with missing key data items and come up with a final sample 
of 423 firm years with an equity issue. The debt issues are sourced from Thomson and consist of all UK issues 
during period 1999-2007, in which a firm issues more than 10 % of debt relative to total assets at the end of the 
previous year. After retrieving financial data from Thomson’s Worldscope and stock data from Datastream, I 
exclude all the debt issues with missing key data items and come up with a sample of 1,096 firm years with a 
debt issue. Panel C) The table shows mean and median deal values and relative deal sizes of the issuer stock 
market performance sample. The equity issues are sourced from Dealogic in a similar manner to the data in 
Panel B) with the exception that more equity issues (543) are qualified to the final sample due to looser 
requirements on the data availability.   
 
 
 
Panel A:  Macro-level determinants sample
Year Deal value Cont'd Year N Deal value
(Mean) (Mean)
1994 59.8 2002 123 193.1
1995 114.0 2003 154 72.7
1996 55.4 2004 200 108.9
1997 76.4 2005 258 82.0
1998 111.4 2006 248 85.7
1999 138.4 2007 289 77.2
2000 151.5 2008 170 281.6
2001 230.2
Total 2,670 118.1
151
  Sample characteristics
N
151
126
184
123
113
137
243
35 
 
 
 
The three separate samples collected for the purposes of the thesis are presented in the Table 
IV. The number of issues in macro determinant sample (2,670) is clearly larger than in micro 
determinant (423) and issuer stock market performance sample (543), since for the purposes 
of macro level analysis, I do not need to collect issuer specific data. Moreover, the issuer 
specific data requirements in cross-sectional samples force to exclude a number of 
observations, and to truncate the period by five years due to missing identification criteria. 
 
Panel A in Table IV shows that the year 2007 is the peak year in equity issuance with 289 
SEOs in total, but the mean deal value is only € 77.2 million. Similarly in most of the years of 
high deal volume, the mean deal value appears to be lower than in years of lower deal value. 
  Sample characteristics (continued)
Panel B:  Micro-level determinants sample
Year Deal value Deal size N Deal value Deal size
(Median) (Median) (Median) (Median)
1999 64.2 18 % 125 40.0 16 %
2000 48.1 12 % 150 39.1 19 %
2001 33.6 20 % 117 21.7 25 %
2002 60.2 25 % 64 16.7 20 %
2003 20.7 20 % 50 28.4 25 %
2004 15.3 17 % 75 24.1 17 %
2005 29.1 10 % 136 36.9 20 %
2006 18.9 9 % 162 26.0 19 %
2007 20.7 12 % 217 28.3 16 %
Total 24.0 13 % 1,096 30.8 19 %
Panel  C:  Issuer stock market performance sample
Year Mean Median Mean Median
1999 66.9 22.0 58 % 32 %
2000 231.8 47.1 19 % 11 %
2001 158.6 30.3 44 % 23 %
2002 208.0 31.5 44 % 28 %
2003 77.7 19.3 56 % 33 %
2004 132.6 14.3 51 % 24 %
2005 74.6 25.8 37 % 18 %
2006 94.1 26.0 48 % 24 %
2007 59.5 17.1 38 % 24 %
Total 107.3 22.0 43 % 24 %
37
34
64
74
18
34
N
26
88
423
N
Equity issues Debt issues
29
25
32
59
543
37
48
72
79
93
117
Deal size (% of Mcap)Deal value (€ million)
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A possible explanation is that the hot seasoned equity market enables also smaller firms to 
issue equity, while larger firms are less sensitive to the equity market conditions. Panel B in 
Table IV shows that the sample of equity issues and debt issues are fairly similar to each 
others in deal values and relative deal sizes. Panel C in Table IV shows that mean deal value 
clearly exceeds the median deal value in each of the sample years. The relationship holds also 
when comparing the relative deal sizes. Moreover, mean values are lifted by a small number 
of extremely large issues, while majority of the SEOs tend to be smaller in size.  
 
  
Table V 
Descriptive statistics of macro determinants sample 
 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of macro determinants sample. SEO%, the dependent variable, is the 
total number of UK SEOs in a given quarter divided by the number of listed firms at the end of the previous 
year. Stdev Mret[0] is the daily standard deviation of FTSE All-Share index within a quarter. Analyst dispersion[-
1] is the weighted average standard deviation of analyst recommendations on FTSE 100 index firms at the end of 
the preceding quarter, where the weights are number of analysts following a firm. GDP growth[-1,+2] is the UK 
GDP growth from 1 quarter before to 2 quarters after the given quarter. Sales growth[+1,+4] is the average sales 
growth of all UK listed firms from 1 quarter to 4 quarters following the given quarter. Interest rate[-4,-1] is the 
average LIBOR rate from 4 quarters prior to 1 quarter prior to the given quarter. SENT index[0] is the level of 
UK consumer sentiment in the quarter. M/B[0] is the median market-to-book of all UK listed firms. Mret[-4,-1] is 
the return on FTSE All-Share index from four quarters to one quarter prior to the given quarter. Mret[+1,+4] is the 
return on FTSE All-Share index from one quarter to four quarters following the given quarter. The sample 
consists of 59 quarterly observations from Q1 1994 to Q3 2008. Number of SEOs is sourced from Dealogic, 
financial data from Thomson’s Worldscope, data on analyst recommendations from Thomson’s I/B/E/S history 
and stock data and economic variables from Datastream. Skewness measures the shape of variable’s distribution 
and Kurtosis indicates whether larger than normal proportion of variable’s variance stems from extreme 
observations. Jarque-Bera addresses whether the variable is from a normal distribution based on the values of 
Skewness and Kurtosis. 
 
 
 Mean Median Max Min Stdev  Skew- 
ness
Kurtosis  Jarque-
Bera
 Prob. n
SEO% 0.026 0.026 0.060 0.010 0.009 0.709 4.411 9.838 0.007 59
a
Information asymmetry
Stdev Mret[0] 0.009 0.008 0.024 0.004 0.004 1.302 4.572 22.739 0.000 59
Analyst dispersion[-1] 0.769 0.803 0.954 0.523 0.100 -0.553 2.753 3.211 0.201 59
Investment opportunities
GDP growth[-1,+2] 0.027 0.028 0.048 -0.049 0.014 -3.143 17.099 585.80 0.000 59
Sales growth[+1,+4] 0.076 0.107 0.272 -0.143 0.093 -0.338 2.466 1.821 0.402 59
Interest rate[-4,-1] 0.055 0.057 0.075 0.037 0.010 -0.088 2.196 1.667 0.435 59
Investor sentiment
SENT index[0] -5.220 -4.230 4.700 -24.900 5.685 -1.096 4.925 20.930 0.000 59
Market timing
M/B[0] 1.816 1.942 2.812 0.890 0.461 -0.184 2.236 1.768 0.413 59
Mret[-4,-1] 0.101 0.152 0.401 -0.286 0.156 -0.658 2.616 4.624 0.099 59
Mret[+1,+4] 0.078 0.138 0.401 -0.305 0.177 -0.634 2.342 5.018 0.081 59
a The removal of the single outlier observation at Q1 2000 eliminates the problem of increased Kurtosis and guarantees that 
OLS requirements will be fulfilled
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Table V above presents the descriptive statistics of the macro level determinant sample. The 
proxy variables are classified into four different categories. Further, the power of each 
category in explaining the SEO volume fluctuation at the macro level is tested in the thesis. 
The  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable,  SEO%, does  not  seem to  suffer  from Skewness,  
yet Kurtosis suggests the sample may not be normally distributed. As a further measure of 
robustness, I investigate the time series properties of SEO% without the outlier observation at 
Q1 2000 and conclude that OLS requirements are fulfilled, due to the decrease in Kurtosis 
back to acceptable levels. 
 
Table VI 
Firm characteristic of micro determinants sample 
 
The table presents the sample firm characteristics of equity issuers and debt issuers employed in the tests of 
micro determinants. Equity issues are sourced from Dealogic and debt issues from Thomson. The firm financials 
are sourced from Thomson’s Worldscope and stock data from Datastream. The sample period ranges from 1999 
to 2007 and contains 423 firm years with an equity issue and 1 097 firm years with a debt issue. ANA is analyst 
following dummy variable that gets value of 1 if the firm is followed by one or more analysts and value of 0 if 
the firm is not followed by analysts. Slack is the cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets at the previous 
year end. LEV is a measure of firm leverage and is calculated as total interest-bearing debt divided by total 
assets  at  the  previous  year  end.  GRO is  the  sales  growth  during  the  issue  year.  INV is  a  measure  investment  
calculated as capital expenditures during previous year divided by total assets at the previous year end. M / B is 
market cap divided by total common equity at the previous year end. Stock PRE is the 12-month raw stock 
return before the issue. Stock POST is the 12-month stock return following an issue. VOL is the daily volatility 
of the firm’s stock returns from 250 trading days before the issue to 50 trading days before the issue. ROA is 
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by previous year end total assets. DIV is a dividend 
dummy variable that gets value of 1 if firm’s dividend payout ratio is 20 % or higher and value of 0 otherwise. 
R&D is a research and development dummy variable that gets value of 1 if the firm reports R&D expenditures 
and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of previous year total sales. TNG denotes to tangibility of assets 
and is calculated as property, plant and equipment divided by total assets at the previous year end. The last 
column reports t-statistics of equal means between equity issuers and debt issuers, where * and ** denote to 
statistical significance of difference in means at 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. 
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Difference t -stat
ANA 0.745 1.000 0.718 1.000 0.026 1.05
Slack 0.134 0.064 0.100 0.054 0.034 3.98**
LEV 0.222 0.199 0.220 0.182 0.002 0.16
GRO 0.527 0.189 0.297 0.137 0.231 3.81**
INV 0.064 0.034 0.067 0.038 -0.004 -0.72
M / B 2.153 1.183 1.459 0.985 0.694 4.49**
Stock PRE 0.288 0.327 0.087 0.138 0.201 5.95**
Stock POST -0.201 0.019 -0.140 -0.012 -0.061 -1.43
VOL 0.024 0.020 0.021 0.017 0.003 4.02**
ROA 0.075 0.085 0.110 0.114 -0.035 -4.59**
DIV 0.362 0.000 0.536 1.000 -0.175 -6.28**
R&D 0.312 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.114 4.46**
SIZE 11.538 11.278 11.665 11.502 -0.127 -1.10
TNG 0.275 0.166 0.318 0.224 -0.043 -2.64**
Debt issuers (n=1,097)Equity issuers (n=423)
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The sample characteristics of equity issuers and the control group, the debt issuers, employed 
in the analysis of SEO micro determinants are presented in Table VI. The equity and debt 
issuers appear to have several distinct characteristics. Moreover, equity issuers have higher 
stock return volatility, more financial slack, higher market-to-book and experience higher 
stock returns before the issue. On the other hand, equity issuers have lower tangibility of 
assets, lower dividend payout ratio and suffer from lower return on assets. The issuer stock 
market performance sample characteristics are strongly similar to equity issuers’ sample 
shown in Table VI, because both samples are derived in the same manner from the same 
sources. Therefore, the sample characteristics of issuer stock market performance tests are not 
reported separately. The correlation coefficients between variables used in macro determinant 
analyses and micro determinant analyses are shown in the Appendices 2 and 3 respectively. 
Macro determinant sample and issuer stock market performance samples by industries are 
shown in the Appendix 4. Finally, a list of specific data items used in the tests are shown in 
the Appendix 5. 
 
5 METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1  Determinants of seasoned equity offerings 
5.1.1 OLS regression 
The macro level determinants of the SEO volume and the determinants of the abnormal 
returns, both around the announcement and in the long-term, are estimated by means of cross-
sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. According to Dougherty (2002, p.114-118)  
OLS regression with variable Y depending on number of independent variables X2, X3, … , Xn 
with an unknown true relationship can be specified in the following manner 
  ikikii uXXY ????? ??? ...221 .             (1) 
In a sample of n observations on variables Y, X2, X3, … , Xk the OLS regression is used to fit 
the equation  
  kiki XbXbbY ????
?
...221  ,             (2) 
where values for coefficients b1, b2, … , bn are fitted so that the residuals’ sum of squares are 
minimized. OLS, therefore, provides estimates of the independent, explanatory variables’ X2, 
X3, … , Xn  impact on the dependent variable Y. 
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The use of time series data with frequent intervals exposes the test results to certain 
difficulties, such as multicollinearity and autocorrelation. As autocorrelation is likely to be 
present in the quarterly time series regressions used to measure the economy-wide SEO 
volume, I use procedure suggested by Dougherty (2002, p. 342-344) by fitting a term with 
first lag of the regressors specified as part of the error term, which eliminates the problem of 
first-order autocorrelation in the regression models. As it comes to multicollinearity, time 
series data always suffers from it to a certain degree. 
5.1.2 Logit regression 
To address the micro level determinants of the SEOs, I perform cross-sectional logit 
regression analysis. I utilize the properties of logit regression in comparing firms that issue 
equity and firms that issue debt to distinct between firm characteristic that lead into SEO 
decision. I also report a single model with non-issuers as the control sample. Similar models 
have been performed by a number of authors (see, e.g., Marsh (1982), Hovakimian et al. 
(2001), Jung et al. (1996)).  Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) elaborate that logit regression is a 
well specified model to study the impact of independent variables to the binary dependent 
variable. Following Menard (2002) a logit regression overcomes the problems in linear 
models by estimating the log of the odds of falling into category 1, in this case SEO.  Logit 
estimation with more than one explanatory variable hypothesizes that the probability of a 
given occurrence is determined by the function 
  Ziii e
ZFp ??
??
1
1)( ,               (3) 
where   Zi kiki XX ??? ???? ...221 .            (4) 
In this setting, parameters ?2, …, ?k refer  to  firm-specific  ex  ante  attributes.  By  means  of  
maximum likelihood estimation, the logit model assesses the impact of firm attributes to the 
likelihood of issuing seasoned equity. I use Huber-White robust covariances to alleviate the 
potential problem of heteroscedasticity. To estimate the strength of the relationship between a 
firm characteristic and the decision to issue equity, I use z-statistic and pseudo-R2 similarly to 
t-statistics and adjusted R2 in OLS-regression.  
 
5.2  Abnormal returns of seasoned equity issuers 
I measure sample firms’ cumulative abnormal returns around the event to assess the possible 
wealth effects caused by the event. Furthermore, Brown and Warner (1980) discuss the 
properties of the event studies and claim that the magnitude of the abnormal return around the 
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announcement of an unanticipated event represents the impact of the event to firm 
claimholders. Moreover, in this thesis I employ event study methodologies suggested by 
Brown and Warner (1980) and (1985). 
5.2.1 Short-term abnormal returns 
I employ simple market model using OLS regression to estimate the abnormal performance of 
a security given the normal return predicted by its historical relationship with a benchmark 
index. Brown and Warner (1980) state that the strength of the market model lies in its ability 
to take into account the market wide movements in the stock prices that occur around the 
events of individual firms. The market index used to measure Rmt is the value-weighted FTSE 
All-Share index.8,9 In order to estimate parameter values of ?i and ?i for each event firm, I use 
an estimation period of -290 to -40 trading days before the event. To be more precise, I 
employ the following market model 
  itmtiiit RR ??? ??? ,              (5) 
where Rit is the return for particular security i during day t and Rmt is the return for the 
benchmark index for the same day. ?i measures the sensitivity of security i to changes in the 
market index, ?i is an average measure of return not captured by the estimated ?i and finally, ?i 
is the disturbance term assumed to be independent of market return and have a zero mean. The 
abnormal return ARit caused by the event is measured using the ?i and ?i estimated in equation 
(5) in the following manner 
  )( mtiiitit RaRAR
??
??? ? .              (6) 
After calculating the abnormal returns for individual firms, I combine the sample to measure 
the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all the event firms. CARs are calculated 
as follows 
  ?
?
?
n
i
tttti ARn
CAR
1
,],[, 2121
1 ,              (7) 
where t1 and t2 are the beginning and the end of the event window period respectively. I 
calculate and report  CARs for different time windows around the event,  but mainly refer to 
commonly used [-1,+1] window, that is one trading day before the event to one trading day 
                                               
8 FTSE All-Share is the headline stock index in the United Kingdom aggregating the stocks of FTSE100, 
FTSE250 and FTSE Small-Cap corporations listed in the London Stock Exchange. FTSE All-Share contains 619 
constituents and with a market capitalization of £1.28 trillion accounts for over 8 % of world’s total equity 
market capitalization. (www.ftse.com) 
9 Asset pricing models generally refer to the use of value-weighted model. See more discussion in Brown and 
Warner (1980) p. 35-39  
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after the event, when discussing the empirical findings. In addition to the market model 
estimates, I address the robustness of the results by calculating also market adjusted returns 
measured simply as the event firm return less market return. 
5.2.2 Long-term abnormal returns 
As pointed out by numerous authors, see for example Kothari and Warner (1996, 2007) and 
Barber and Lyon (1997), short-term event studies are usually well specified, but in the long-
term, numerous biases may occur. Barber and Lyon (1997) highlight three sources of biases 
present in often used event study methodologies. Namely, new listing bias, rebalancing bias 
and skeweness bias may all have an impact on the results if the model for detecting long-term 
event returns is not correctly specified. Moreover, according to Kothari and Warner (1996), 
both sample selection process and model specification may lead into flawed results. For the 
mitigation of the possible biases, Lyon et al. (1999) suggest careful sample design and using 
well specified matches to benchmark for normal returns.  
 
Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999) and Kothari and Warner (1996) discuss the merits 
of various approaches and state that the strength of buy-and-hold abnormal return approach 
(BHAR) is in its ability to better track actual investors’ portfolio decisions, and moreover, the 
use of carefully specified matching firms yields unbiased results. In a similar manner, 
Jegadeesh (2000) investigates the ability of various specifications to measure abnormal long-
term returns and concludes that the matching firm technique is superior to factor-models. I 
calculate BHARs using both, FTSE All-Share benchmark index and firms matched based on 
size and market-to-book to measure abnormal returns for event firms.  Buy-and-hold returns 
for a period of T months are calculated as follows 
  ??
??
????
T
t
it
T
t
itiT ERBHAR
11
)1()1( ,             (8) 
where Eit is the return on the benchmark firm or portfolio and Rit is the return on event firm i. 
I calculate and report conventional cross-sectional t-statistics as suggested by Lyon et al. 
(1999).    
nAR
ARt
t
t
)(?? ,                     (9) 
where tAR  is the sample mean, )( tAR?  is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation and n 
represents the number of observations in a given sample. I calculate the BHARs for various 
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time-periods, but mainly refer to 24-month and 36-month horizons in the analysis of the 
findings.10  
 
To investigate the impact of firm-specific characteristics on the issuer abnormal returns I 
follow similar procedure to Andrikopoulos (2009) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) and use 
non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test. Specifically, I measure the difference in 
medians between subsamples of firms sorted by the hypothesized firm-specific ex ante 
characteristics. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank assumes and tests whether the two samples are of the 
same distribution. The absolute values of deviations from median are assigned a rank and the 
sum of the positive values is denoted as D. Wilcoxon signed-rank test z-statistics is computed 
as follows: 
  
D
EDDz ?
)(??               (10) 
where  
4
)1()( ?? nnDE              (11) 
and  
24
)12)(1(2 ??? nnnD? ,              (12) 
                
while E(D) and ??? refer to sample expected value of ranked deviations’ sum and variance of 
ranked deviations respectively. Under the assumption that the subsamples are drawn from the 
same distribution, z-statistics follows a normal distribution. 
 
6 RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results from empirical analyses that I perform to 
address the key research questions of the thesis. The first section elaborates the findings on 
economy-wide fluctuations in SEO volume and cross-sectional attributes of firms that decide 
to use SEO as a means of financing. The second section concentrates on the stock market 
performance of the SEO firms and the factors driving the performance.  
  
                                               
10 Traditional long horizon event studies employ time periods from 12 to 60 months subsequent to the event. In 
my thesis, I limit the period to 36 months as the offering data from the United Kingdom mainly is available from 
the recent 10-year period and therefore, following stock performance 60 months after the event would 
considerably decrease the sample size. 
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6.1  Macro and micro level determinants of seasoned equity offerings 
The focus of this section is the determinants of the SEOs. The first subsection concentrates on 
the economy-wide determinants of SEO volume, while the second subsection addresses the 
determinants  of  micro  level  determinants  of  choice  between equity  and  debt.  Finally,  Table  
IX  at  the  end  of  the  section  pools  together  the  hypotheses  tested  in  the  section  and  the  
empirical evidence found on the determinants of SEOs. 
 
6.1.1 Macro level determinants of SEOs 
The results shown in the subsection contribute to the ongoing debate on the factors that cause 
fluctuation in equity issue volumes. The subsection tests hypotheses H1-H4 on macro level 
determinants of SEOs. Howe and Zhang (2009) investigate the drivers of the SEO cycles and 
find that market timing and demand for capital seem to motivate equity issues the most. IPO 
volume, according to Lowry (2003) and Pastor and Veronesi (2005), fluctuates much of the 
same reasons. Moreover, they conclude that demand for capital, investor sentiment and 
market variables are important determinants of the IPO cycles. 
 
Table VII 
Macro determinants of SEOs 
 
The table shows the impact of four different categories of proxies on the macro level SEO% defined as the 
number of UK SEOs in a quarter divided by the number listed firms at the end of the previous year. Stdev of 
daily mkt return[t=0] is the daily standard deviation of FTSE All-Share index returns within a quarter. Analyst 
dispersion[-1] is the weighted average standard deviation of analyst recommendations on FTSE 100 index 
companies at the end of the preceding quarter, where the number of analysts following a firm are the weights. 
Sales growth[+1,+4] is the sales growth of all UK listed companies from 1 quarter to 4 quarters following the given 
quarter.  GDP growth[-1,+2] is the UK GDP growth from 1 quarter prior to 2 quarters following the given quarter. 
Interest rate avg.[-4,-1] is the average LIBOR rate from four quarters prior to one quarter prior to the given quarter. 
SENT index[0] is the UK consumer sentiment in the quarter. Market-to-book median[0] is the market-to-book of 
all UK listed companies. Mkt return[-4,-1] is the return on FTSE All-Share index from four quarters to one quarter 
prior to given quarter. Mkt return[+1,+4] is the return on FTSE All-Share index from one quarter to four quarters 
following a given quarter. AR(1) specification eliminates first order autocorrelation by importing the first lag of 
independent variables to the model. The sample consists of 59 quarterly observations from Q1 1994 to Q3 2008. 
Number of SEOs is sourced from Dealogic, financial data from Thomson’s Worldscope, data on analyst 
recommendations from I/B/E/S history, while stock data and economic variables are retrieved from Datastream. 
Adjusted R-squared and F-statistics are reported as measures of model precision. T-statistics, using 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors as suggested by White, of no relationship between dependent and 
independent variables are reported under coefficients, where * and ** denote to statistical significance of the 
relationship between variables at 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. 
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With a sample of 59 quarterly observations including 2,670 UK SEOs, I find strong evidence 
supporting market timing and demand for capital hypotheses. Table VII presents the results 
from various time-series regression models. In the UK market, the most significant drivers of 
macro  fluctuation  in  SEOs are  sales  growth,  interest  rates  and  stock  market  returns  prior  to  
and following an issue.  
i)  Demand for capital  
When aggregate future sales growth in the UK is high, firms’ demand for capital is at its 
highest, and a fraction of the demand is satisfied by means of seasoned equity offerings. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information 
asymmetry
Capital 
demand
Market 
timing
Investor 
sentiment All proxies
a All proxiesb
   Intercept 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05
14.10** 5.25** 2.61* 10.68** 4.14** 4.10**
Information asymmetry proxies
   Stdev of daily mkt return[0] -0.95 -0.78 -0.86
-6.21** -2.62* -2.79**
   Analyst dispersion[-1] -0.01 -0.01 0.00
0.56 -0.95 -0.24
Capital demand proxies
   Sales growth[+1,+4] 0.05 0.05 0.04
3.16** 3.83** 3.94**
   GDP growth [-1,+2] -0.09 -0.07 -0.12
-0.67 -0.99 -1.71
   Interest rate avg.[-4,-1] -0.31 -0.40 -0.33
-2.44* -4.51** -4.40**
Market timing proxies
   Market to Book median[0] 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.20 -0.92 -0.22
   Mkt return[-4,-1] 0.03 0.03 0.02
2.34* 2.73** 2.89**
   Mkt return[+1,+4] -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
-1.50 -3.81** -3.33**
Investor sentiment proxies
   SENT index[0] 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.18 -3.13** -2.16*
   AR (1) specification 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.46 -0.04 0.11
2.97** 2.23* 2.61* 3.66** -0.34 0.98
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.19 0.50 0.57
F-statistic 8.47 6.27 7.42 7.81 6.76 8.52
P-value, F-statistic <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01**
Number of observations 58 58 58 58 58 57
a M odel using all quarterly observations, b model excluding single outlier observation at Q1 2000
  OLS-regression
  Dependent varaible: SEO%
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Interestingly, Lowry (2003) finds that sales growth of public firms is related to the number of 
IPOs, yet the findings presented in Table VII indicate that the mechanism for SEOs is 
somewhat stronger. Namely the t-statistics of sales growth at 3.94 persists after inclusion of 
various control variables and is clearly statistically significant at all conventional levels. The 
strength of the demand for capital hypothesis is further supported by the negative and 
statistically significant sign of interest rates with a t-statistics of 4.40. Using a large sample of 
US SEOs, Howe and Zhang (2009) report similar findings on interest rate, but their findings 
on  the  role  of  future  sales  growth  contradicts  with  mine.  In  their  models,  GDP growth  is  a  
significant  determinant  of  SEOs.  A  possible  interpretation  of  the  difference  is  that  GDP  
growth and sales growth actually measure the changes in same underlying fundamentals, but 
only at slightly different perspectives.  
ii)  Market timing 
Market timing variables are significant macro determinants of SEOs. Namely, high volume 
periods occur after 12-month stock market run-ups and are followed by periods of low returns 
even after controlling for market-to-book. The coefficients of both variables, pre and post-
issue 12-month stock market returns, are statistically significant at the 1 % level. Pastor and 
Veronesi (2005) develop a model of optimal IPO timing and report similar findings on stock 
market mechanics around the IPO volume fluctuations.  
iii)  Information asymmetry  
After controlling for multiple classes of hypotheses, the impact of information asymmetry 
proxies deteriorate. Yet, stock market volatility still seems to be an important determinant 
with more companies filing an SEO when market volatility is at a low level. Moreover, the t-
stat of market volatility is -2.62 after controlling for various factors. Howe and Zhang (2009) 
find market volatility to affect in a similar way, but being only marginally statistically 
significant. The analyst dispersion as an information asymmetry proxy enters the regression 
models with a weak negative sign, but does not seem to be an important determinant of macro 
level SEO volume.  
iv)  Investor sentiment 
Finally, the hypothesized link between investor sentiment and macro SEO volume is weak at 
most, or alternatively, the consumer sentiment index does not indicate such relationship to 
exist. The hypothesized positive linkage is not supported by the regression estimates, while 
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Howe and Zhang (2009) report similar weak association between consumer sentiment index 
and SEO volume.  
 
 
Panel A. The joint effect of daily market volatility and sales growth on median SEO%. 
 
 
Panel B. The joint effect of pre and post-issue market returns on median SEO%. 
  
 
Figure 2: Macro determinants of SEOs 
The figure presents the impact of selected macro level variables on SEO%. SEO% is the number of SEOs in the 
UK within a quarter divided by the number public companies at the end of the previous year. Panel A) shows the 
joint effect of sales growth and daily market volatility on SEO% while Panel B) shows the joint effect of 
preceding and subsequent market stock returns on SEO%. Daily market volatility is the daily standard deviation 
of FTSE All-Share index returns within a quarter. Sales growth is the sales growth of all UK listed companies 
from 1 quarter to 4 quarters following the given quarter. Mkt return[-4,-1] is the return on FTSE All-Share index 
from four quarters to one quarter prior to the given quarter. Mkt return[+1,+4] is  the  return  on  FTSE All-Share  
index from one quarter to four quarters following a given quarter. The sample consists of 59 quarterly 
observations from Q1 1994 to Q3 2008. Number of SEOs is sourced from Dealogic, financial data from 
Thomson’s Worldscope while stock data and economic variables are retrieved from Datastream. 
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Figure 2 graphically illustrates the joint effect of market volatility and sales growth, as well as 
the impact of stock market returns prior to and following a quarter on the UK SEO volume. 
Furthermore, as shown in Panel A, a decrease in market volatility leads into a notable increase 
in number of SEOs. Similarly, higher sales growth is accompanied by an increase in the 
number of SEOs. The joint explanatory power of the two variables seems strong. On the other 
hand, the impact of market timing variables seems two-fold. While the higher level of stock 
returns before the quarter clearly leads into an ascended SEO volume, the stock returns 
following an issue has a less clear relationship with the SEO volume. Panel B in Figure 2 
indicates that high volume SEO quarters occur following a stock market run-up, but low 
future stock returns lead into an increased number of issues, only when the stock market 
returns have been poor ex ante. Lowry (2003) discusses several potential reasons for the 
observed patterns of stock market performance around the changes in equity issue volume. 
First, investors realize that firms’ demand for capital is increasing and market returns increase 
in response to the investment opportunities. Second, market returns can be lifted by the 
increase in investor optimism. Third, market returns may reflect changes in the stock market 
premium.  
 
To conclude the analysis on macro determinants, it seems that the most consistent 
determinants  of  SEOs  at  the  macro  level  are  demand  for  capital  (sales  growth)  and  market  
timing (past stock market returns). The evidence to support the two additional hypotheses on 
investor sentiment and information asymmetry seems fragile. The presented findings on 
market timing and demand for capital provide an interesting platform to study the micro level 
determinants of seasoned equity offerings, which will be the topic of interest in the 
subsequent subsection. 
6.1.2 Micro level determinants of SEOs 
This subsection extends the macro level analysis of SEOs to a single-firm decision making 
analysis. I aim to distinct between firm characteristics that explain why some firms choose an 
SEO while others issue debt and thus, test hypotheses H5-H7 on micro level determinants of 
SEOs. Jung et al. (1996) and Marsh (1982) perform similar analysis on the debt-equity 
choice, while Hovakimian et al. (2001) analyze changes in capital structure using similar 
models. When deciding on the set of independent variables to the regression models, I partly 
follow prior literature, add new variables when necessary to test the posed hypotheses and 
avoid  pairs  of  variables  with  high  correlation  to  maintain  robustness  of  results.  A  great  
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majority of the literature on company financial policy employ a fixed set of control variables 
in regressions: company size, capital structure, profitability, research and development 
intensiveness, tangibility of assets and the level of financial slack. I see no reason to deviate 
from the norm, even when the coefficients indicate that the variable does not belong to the 
model. Finally, as the UK evidence on determinants of equity issuance is largely lacking, I 
analyze my results in light of the existing US literature  
 
Table VIII 
Micro determinants of SEOs 
 
The table shows determinants of cross-sectional SEO vs. debt issue choice. In models (1) – (4), the likelihood of 
company specific factors on SEO vs. debt issue choice is estimated by logit regression where SEOs get value of 
1 and debt issues value of 0. Equity issues are sourced from Dealogic and debt issues from Thomson. The 
company financials are sourced from Thomson’s Worldscope, data on analyst following from I/B/E/S history 
and stock data from Datastream. The sample period ranges from 1999 to 2007 and contains 423 firm years with 
an equity issue and 1 097 firm years with a debt issue. In model (5), the likelihood of the firm-specific factors on 
SEO vs.  non-SEO choice  is  estimated,  where  SEOs get  value  of  1  and non-SEOs get  value  of  0.  The  sample  
includes the similar 423 firm years with an SEO and 9 130 firm years with no SEO. Analyst coverage dummy 
variable gets value of 1 if the firm is followed by one or more analysts, and value of 0 otherwise. Stdev of firms’ 
daily stock return is measured from 250 trading days before the issue to 50 trading days before the issue. PRE 
and POST stock returns are calculated as the firm’s raw returns for the 12-month period prior to and following 
an issue. Dividend is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if firm’s dividend payout ratio is 20 % or higher and 
value of 0 otherwise. R&D is a research and development dummy variable that gets value of 1 if the firm reports 
R&D expenditures and 0 otherwise.  Financial slack (cash and cash equivalents / total assets), Debt / Total 
assets, Capex / Total assets, EBITDA / Total assets, Market-to-Book, LNsales and PPE / Total assets are 
measured at the previous year end. Sales growth is measured in the issue year. Z-statistics, with 
heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors as suggested by Huber and White, of no impact on equity vs. 
debt choice likelihood are reported, where * and ** denote to statistical significance of the relationship at 5 % 
and 1 % levels respectively. Pseudo-R2 and LR statistic are reported as measures of model explanatory power. 
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The results from the logit regression performed to analyze micro level determinants of SEOs 
are presented in Table VIII. As shown, the multivariate analysis reveals that several distinct 
characteristics between equity and debt issuers exist. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Information 
asymmetry
Capital 
demand
Market 
timing
All proxies
All 
proxiesa
Information asymmetry proxies
   Analyst coverage 0.539 0.539 0.831
3.26** 2.62** 5.49**
   Debt / Total assets 0.797 1.388 4.451
2.30* 3.59** 10.08**
Capital demand proxies
   Sales growth 0.002 0.002 1.297
2.63** 2.51* 8.32**
   R&D 0.563 0.629 0.632
3.79** 3.97** 3.72**
   Capex / Total assets 1.034 0.374 -0.087
1.04 0.34 -0.18
Market timing proxies
   Market-to-book 0.110 0.105 -0.008
1.96* 1.70 -0.75
   PRE 12m stock return 0.696 0.684 0.848
3.92** 3.68** 4.51**
   POST 12m stock return -0.192 -0.206 -0.478
-1.81 -1.81 -2.98**
Control variables
   Stdev of daily return 11.060 7.414 15.065 14.997 57.205
2.41* 1.50 2.70** 2.42* 9.45**
   EBITDA / Total assets -0.985 -0.974 -2.105 -1.817 -1.754
-1.82 -1.75 -3.13** -2.61** -2.10*
   Dividend -0.464 -0.342 -0.309 -0.218 -0.675
-3.30** -2.33* -2.08* -1.41 -5.20**
   Financial slack 1.491 1.088 0.668 1.091 -0.239
3.18** 2.29* 1.24 1.86 -0.40
   LNsales -0.006 0.018 0.083 -0.029 -0.378
-0.15 0.52 2.61** -0.70 -9.31**
   PPE / Total assets -0.466 -0.304 -0.136 -0.287 0.004
-2.06* -1.06 -0.59 -0.92 1.19   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R 2 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.24
LR statistic 117.38 125.63 156.03 195.25 723.74
Prob. LR statistic (?2) <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01**
Number of observations 1,464 1,371 1,402 1,321 9,328
a Regression model (5) employs a sample of non-SEO firm years as the control sample
  Logit regression
  SEO = 1, Debt issue = 0 a
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i)  Information asymmetry 
I  observe  and  report  analyst  coverage  and  leverage  to  be  positively  associated  with  the  
likelihood of equity issue. After controlling for other hypotheses, both proxies on information 
asymmetry maintain statistical significance at the 1 % level. Jung et al. (1996) report high 
leverage to affect in a similar manner – they argue that it possibly reflects the impact of 
deviation  from  the  firm’s  target  leverage.  Similarly,  several  authors  are  of  the  opinion  that  
high leverage is a characteristic of low growth opportunity and low information asymmetry 
firms and therefore, it should be positively related to the likelihood of SEO issuance. (Dittmar 
and Thakor (2007), Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
ii)  Demand for capital 
In model (2) of Table VIII the capital demand proxies enter the regression with positive sign, 
yet only sales growth and research and development expenditures show statistical 
significance. Theoretically according Myers (1977) framework, high investment opportunity 
firms should be of low leverage as equityholders get all the benefit from the upside potential, 
while debtholders bear the increased costs of financial distress. All in all, my findings indicate 
that proxies of capital demand are among the main characteristics to lead into an increased 
probability of an equity issue. 
iii)  Market timing 
Market timing proxies, as numerous authors report, are clear distinct factor between equity 
and debt issuers. Jung et al. (1996) report that both market-to-book and past stock returns are 
significantly related to the likelihood of an equity issue. Moreover, they argue that the strong 
association between past stock returns and equity issue likelihood stems from the managers’ 
activity to time the market. The authors in addition state that the presence of market-to-book 
is highly significant in the regression given that the omission of the variable leads pseudo-R2 
to fall by almost one-third. My findings on market timing proxies coincide with theirs’ given 
that the impact of market-to-book in models (3) and (4) is far lower than stated by Jung et al. 
(1996). 
 
I also run logit regressions with the same sample of 432 firm years with equity issue using a 
sample of 9,130 firm years with non-issuers as the control sample.11 As can be hypothesized, 
the demand for capital proxies and market timing proxies show more statistical significance 
                                               
11 The sample collection process of the control sample of no SEO firm years is presented in the Appendix 1. 
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than in the reported models with debt issuers as the control sample.  Earlier literature shows 
that debt issuers are also likely to undergo a period of high stock return preceding an issue 
(see, e.g., Marsh (1982), Jung et al. (1996)), but as the control sample becomes non-issuers, 
the strengthening sign of pre-issue stock returns is expected. Moreover, in the reported 
models  (1)  -  (4)  it  is  given  that  firm  increases  the  level  of  external  capital  for  one  way  or  
another, whereas in the model (5) with non-issuers as the control sample, large fraction of the 
firms choose to do nothing. In these circumstances, the strength of demand for capital proxies 
is natural, as growth firms with solid investment opportunities are more likely to raise 
external capital. The sales growth variable is highly significant at all conventional levels and 
the strong positive sign of R&D variable persist after changing the control group. In addition, 
the positive linkage of both analyst following and leverage further strengthens in model (5), 
which implies that firms who seek equity financing can communicate their intentions to the 
market through the independent analysts and are high leverage firms with low information 
asymmetry by nature. The strong negative sign of logarithm sales and positive sign of 
volatility  indicates  that  the  use  of  non-issuers  as  the  control  sample  leads  into  poor  match  
between the two samples. The coefficient of determination in model (5), pseudo-R2, is clearly 
higher than in models (1) – (4) with debt issuers as the control sample. Therefore, many 
distinct firm characteristics exist between SEO firms and non-issuers. However, I choose to 
only report a single regression with non-issuers as the control group since the earlier literature 
mainly refers to equity vs. debt choice (see, e.g., Marsh (1982), Hovakimian et al. (2001)).  
 
Finally, similarly to the macro level analysis, market timing hypothesis appears to be a strong 
determinant of SEO issuance. In addition, I find strong evidence that low information 
asymmetry firms with analyst coverage and high leverage are likely to conduct an SEO. The 
impact of both market timing and information asymmetry proxies persists in different model 
specifications. The association between demand for capital and SEO likelihood seems slightly 
weaker, yet statistical significance of sales growth and R&D expenditures suggest that 
demand for capital is a micro level determinant of equity issues.  
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Table IX 
Summary of findings on SEO determinants 
 
The table pools together the hypotheses on macro and micro level determinants of SEOs, the proxy variables 
employed in the tests and the empirical findings on the hypotheses. The “+” (positive linkage) and “ –“ (negative 
linkage) signs after the hypotheses address the theoretical prediction of the relationship between each class of 
hypotheses and the SEO volume or decision. The column on the right indicates whether the hypothesis ought to 
be accepted based on the empirical findings. 
 
 
 
Table IX summarizes the findings on the macro and micro determinants of SEOs presented in 
the preceding subsections. Market timing theory of equity issuance documented in several 
academic papers appears to drive the SEOs both at the macro and micro level. Moreover, past 
market returns drive changes in aggregate SEO volume, while firms’ past stock returns 
increase the likelihood of choosing to raise seasoned equity instead of debt. In addition, macro 
level demand for capital proxies, aggregate future sales growth and average interest rates, 
imply strong positive linkage to SEO volume. In addition, I find some evidence to support the 
capital  demand  hypothesis  as  the  micro  level  determinant  of  SEOs.  Namely,  firms  to  issue  
equity have analyst coverage and more levered capital structures as opposed to the debt 
issuers, while also they are more likely to heavily investing growth firms.  After the analyses 
on both macro and micro level determinants the following sections present the findings on 
equity issuers’ stock market performance. 
 
6.2  Issuer stock market performance 
This section presents the findings on SEO firms’ stock market performance around the issue. 
The first subsection presents and discusses the findings on announcement returns and the 
factors determining the observed returns, while the second subsection concentrates on the 
Macro level: the impact of economy-wide variables on SEO volume
Hypotheses & prediction Proxies Accepted/Rejected
H1: Market timing (+)
H2: Asymmetric information (-)
H3: Demand for capital (+)
H4: Investor sentiment (+)
Micro level: the impact of issuer characteristic on choice between equity and debt financing
H5: Market timing (+) Market-to-book, stock return (pre and post)
H6: Asymmetric information (-) Analyst coverage, leverage
H7: Demand for capital (+) Sales growth, capex growth, R&D expenditures
  Summary of findings: macro and micro level determinants of SEOs
Market-to-book, market return (pre and post)
Analyst dispersion, market volatility
Aggregate sales growth, GDP growth, Interest rate
Consumer sentiment index
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Weak support
Accepted
Rejected
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issuer long-term underperformance following the issue using a set of pre-issue firm 
characteristics in explaining the stock market performance. Finally, Table XVII at the end of 
the chapter summarizes the findings on the hypothesized relations between issuer 
characteristics and stock market performance. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns of SEO firms: total observation period 
The figure presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) from 12 months prior to an issue to 36 months 
following the issue for total sample of 543 SEOs during period 1999-2007. All UK SEOs with deal value in 
excess of €5 million are sourced from Dealogic. The financial data for event firms and matching firms are 
sourced from Thomson’s Worldscope, while the stock data are sourced from Datastream. The dim line measures 
BHARs calculated using FTSE All-Share stock index as the benchmark, while the dark line measures BHARs 
calculated using size and market-to-book matched firms as the benchmark. The BHARs represent equally 
weighted sample averages. 
 
 
In general, my findings on the stock return mechanisms around the SEOs are parallel to the 
predominant understanding in the area of issuer stock market performance. Figure 3 presents 
the 48-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns with the observation period starting from 12 
months before the issue. Moreover, despite the chosen benchmark for normal returns, I find 
the issuers to experience statistically significant and economically notable positive abnormal 
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returns during the 12 months preceding the issue. The market adjusted 12-month equally 
weighted average stock returns prior to the issue announcement amount to 34.2 %, while the 
issuers outperform their non-issuing matching firms by 28.0 %. In addition, the issuers begin 
to underperform relative to the benchmarks within six months following the issue and 
continue to be poor long-term investments throughout the 36-month post-issue period. From 
the Figure 3 it can be seen that the use of FTSE All-Share as the benchmark (dim line) leads 
into clearly higher pre-issue abnormal returns than size and market-to-book matched firms 
(black line). On the other hand, the post-issue period dynamics between the two different 
benchmarks are also somewhat different as will be shown in the following subsections.  
6.2.1 Announcement effect  
In this subsection, I focus on the announcement effect of SEOs. I pay attention to the analysis 
of the factors contributing to the abnormal returns. Earlier literature on topic has been mainly 
conducted employing US data (see, e.g., Masulis and Korwar (1986), Asquith and Mullins 
(1986)) and the announcement effect is typically calculated during two or three-day event 
window. Predominant practice in the short-term event studies is to calculate abnormal returns 
using market model estimates for ? and ?. I follow earlier literature and also report market 
adjusted returns. 
 
Table X 
SEO announcement effect: total sample 
 
The table presents the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings at the total sample level. The results are 
estimated and reported using both market model and market adjusted returns and presented separately for [-1,+1] 
and [-5,+5] event windows. The sample of equity issues is sourced from Dealogic, while the stock data is 
sourced from Datastream. The sample period ranges from 1999 to 2007 and contains 543 SEOs in total. 1 % 
with largest and smallest announcement CARs are sorted out from the sample. Equally weighted sample 
averages, t-statistics and proportion of positive CARs are reported. 
 
 
 
Table X shows that at the total sample level, the equally weighted average announcement 
effect of UK SEO firms is slightly positive, employing various event windows and both 
Event window
Average t-stat % positive Average t-stat % positive
Market model 0.08 % 0.22 50.70 % 0.22 % 0.43 49.30 %
Market adjusted 0.14 % 0.32 51.39 % 0.02 % 0.04 50.28 %
[-1,+1] [-5,+5]
Announcement CARsTotal sample of SEOs (n=543)
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market model and market adjusted abnormal returns. The announcement effect is far from 
being statistically significantly different from zero, which is not surprising in the light of the 
previous literature on the UK SEOs. The study with most similar data sample to the one 
employed in the thesis, Barnes and Walker (2006), report total sample weighted average 
announcement effect of -0.33 %. Similarly, Slovin et al. (2000) report announcement effect 
strongly dependent on the floatation method, with the total sample weighted average of -1.44 
%. Their results are parallel to mine given that in their studies, the proportion of rights issues 
is clearly larger than in my sample, while the negative announcement effect in the previous 
studies is driven by rights issues. While considerably large differences in announcement 
effect exist in the cross-section, the abnormal returns are evenly distributed around zero in all 
cases  as  close  to  50  %  of  the  SEOs  undergo  positive  announcement  returns.  All  in  all,  my  
findings support the notion that SEOs in Europe differ somewhat from the US SEOs. A 
possible explanation for the observed differences in the announcement effect is the high 
institutional ownership among the UK pension funds and insurance companies that tend to 
operate as passive long-term investors as opposed to the US mutual funds and investment 
firms. 
 
Table XI 
SEO announcement effect: CARs and issuer characteristics 
 
The table shows the impact of issuer/issue specific factors on the announcement effect of SEOs. Firms are sorted 
into quintiles based on market-to-book (Panel A), 12-month pre-issue stock returns (Panel B), sales growth 
during  the  issue  year  (Panel  C)  and  SEO%,  the  number  of  UK  SEOs  within  the  issue  quarter  divided  by  the  
number of UK listed companies at the previous year end (Panel D). 1 % of observations with largest and smallest 
CARs are removed from the sample. The t-test of equal means and Wilcoxon signed-rank test of equal medians 
between HIGH quintile and LOW quintile address the impact of the given factor to the announcement effect. 
The sample of equity issues is sourced from Dealogic, while the company financials are sourced from 
Thomson’s Worldscope and stock data from Datastream. The sample period ranges from 1999 to 2007 and 
contains 543 SEOs in total. The results are reported separately for market model and market adjusted CARs 
during [-1,+1] event window. T-statistics and z-statistics for no difference between HIGH and LOW quintiles are 
reported next to coefficients, where * and ** denote to statistical significance of the difference at 5 % and 1 % 
levels respectively. 
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Panel A: Market to Book
LOW HIGH
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average -1.1 % -0.5 % 0.7 % -0.5 % 1.1 % Difference 2.2 %
t-stat -1.10 -0.78 0.73 -0.44 0.94 t-stat 1.43
Wilcoxon z-stat 1.63
Average -1.0 % -0.2 % 0.6 % 0.3 % 0.9 % Difference 1.9 %
t-stat -1.09 -0.39 0.65 0.31 0.85 t-stat 1.35
Wilcoxon z-stat 1.76
Panel B: 12-month pre-issue stock return
LOW HIGH
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average -3.7 % 1.7 % -0.6 % 0.5 % 1.8 % Difference 5.5 %
t-stat -3.04** 2.31* -0.99 0.72 2.20* t-stat 3.75**
Wilcoxon z-stat 3.11**
Average -3.4 % 1.7 % -0.5 % 0.9 % 2.9 % Difference 6.2 %
t-stat -2.95** 2.68** -0.86 1.44 3.44** t-stat 4.41**
Wilcoxon z-stat 3.07**
Panel C: Sales growth
LOW HIGH
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average -1.0 % -1.0 % 0.6 % 1.0 % 2.2 % Difference 3.2 %
t-stat -0.66 -0.87 0.55 0.96 2.42* t-stat 1.85
Wilcoxon z-stat 2.96**
Average -1.0 % -1.5 % 0.2 % 1.5 % 2.7 % Difference 3.6 %
t-stat -0.68 -1.31 0.18 1.71 2.85** t-stat 2.14*
Wilcoxon z-stat 2.76**
Panel D: SEO%
LOW HIGH
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average -0.6 % -0.8 % -0.4 % -0.6 % 2.2 % Difference 2.8 %
t-stat -0.58 -0.75 -0.35 -0.71 2.25* t-stat 1.93
Wilcoxon z-stat 1.43
Average -1.2 % -0.6 % 0.4 % -0.1 % 2.1 % Difference 3.3 %
t-stat -1.13 -0.61 0.52 -0.06 2.41* t-stat 2.42*
Wilcoxon z-stat 1.86
HIGH - LOW difference
(5) - (1)
HIGH - LOW difference
Market model
Market model
Market adjusted
Market model
Market adjusted
  Performance of event firm 
quintiles  SEO announcement effect CAR [-1,+1]
Market adjusted
HIGH - LOW difference
(5) - (1)
Market model
HIGH - LOW difference
Market adjusted
(5) - (1)
(5) - (1)
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Univariate analysis on announcement effect determinants 
Table XI presents the relationship between the announcement effect and the firm-specific 
characteristics. Firms are sorted into quintiles based on the hypothesized characteristics of 
impact, which relate to the hypotheses H8-H10. 
i)  Market timing  
Testing the impact of market timing on stock market announcement effect, I employ both 
market-to-book and past stock returns as the market timing proxies. I find past 12-month raw 
stock  return  to  be  significantly  positively  related  to  the  announcement  effect  –  the  results  
persist regardless of the model specification and both calculating from averages and medians. 
However, I find that market-to-book only slightly indicates positive linkage to the 
announcement effect. My findings are partly parallel to the findings in earlier literature. Jung 
et al. (1996) report market-to-book to be positively related to the announcement effect and 
past stock returns to have positive but insignificant effect. Choe et al. (1993), on the other 
hand, show that stock market run-up is positively related to the announcement effect of SEOs, 
but they do not control for the market-to-book. Interestingly, the findings of Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996) contradicts with other prominent research as they find past stock returns to 
positively contribute to the SEO announcement effect only during cold periods of equity 
issuance, while the impact during hot periods is negative. In addition, the sign of q-ratio 
measured as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets remains positive in 
all circumstances, but is significant only in cold periods. The authors hypothesize that the 
documented relationships may stem from investors’ tendency to place more weight on 
measures of firm quality during cold markets when information asymmetry could be more 
hazardous at worst. All in all, the impact of past stock returns seem to be a determinant of the 
UK SEO announcement effect, while the earlier literature from the US reports lower linkage 
between market timing and announcement returns (see, e.g., Choe et al. (1993), Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996)). 
ii)  Demand for capital 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory implies that firms with profitable investment 
opportunities can operate free of information asymmetry problem, due to the well motivated 
demand for capital. The vast literature on topic is of two distinct opinions: while some papers 
report positive correlation between growth opportunities and announcement return, the others 
show high growth firms experiencing more negative returns due to severe information 
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asymmetry. I investigate the impact of capital demand on the SEO announcement effect using 
sales growth- % at the issue year as the demand for capital proxy. Panel C in Table XI shows 
that the impact of sales growth on the announcement effect is positive. Wilcoxon z-statistics 
for difference in medians show statistical significance at 1 % level. Denis (1994) investigates 
the impact of investment opportunities on SEO announcement effect and report similar 
findings. Moreover, he finds that various proxies of growth opportunities have positive 
relationship with equity offering announcement return. A careful analysis suggests that his 
results are driven by a group of extremely fast growing firms and that the findings do not 
apply at the total sample level. On the other hand, Burton et al. (2000) investigate a sample of 
116 UK SEO announcements taking place during the period 1989-1991. They use accounting 
information to proxy for growth opportunities and report that while income growth is the only 
variable with a positive impact on the announcement effect, the relationship is not monotonic, 
and instead driven by a group of highly unprofitable firms. In response to the findings of 
Denis (1994) and Burton et al. (2000), I sort out young firms and firms in extreme fast growth 
phase and despite get similar results than reported in Table XI. Furthermore, the finding 
indicates that the demand for capital hypothesis seems to contribute to the announcement 
effect, but the results have to be analyzed further. The implication of the observed finding 
could be that high capital demand firms can invest the cash raised by an SEO more profitably 
than firms with low demand for capital. Finally, Walker and Yost (2008) conclude that market 
interprets SEO announcement positively, if the firm has solid investment opportunities.   
iii)  SEO volume 
Panel D in Table XI reports the relationship between macro level SEO volume and the 
announcement effect. I find the highest market volume quintile to undergo significantly 
positive announcement return, while the remaining four quintiles do not show remarkable 
differences from each others. The findings are consistent with the information asymmetry 
hypothesis, namely during extremely active periods of equity issuance investors know the 
lemons problem is at its smallest. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) report similar findings as 
they find hot period SEOs to have significantly higher announcement returns than cold period 
SEOs. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) and Choe et al. (1993) explain the phenomenon to stem 
from investors’ estimates on probability of overvaluation, which fluctuate along with stock 
market variables and macroeconomic conditions.  
 
 
59 
 
 
Table XII 
SEO announcement effect: regression analysis of CARs 
 
The table shows OLS regression estimates for determinants of cumulative abnormal returns around the 
announcement of SEOs. The regressions are estimated for event windows of [-1,+1] and [-5,+5] days using both 
market model and market adjusted returns in estimation of CARs. The sample of equity issues is sourced from 
Dealogic, while the company financials are sourced from Thomson’s Worldscope and stock data from 
Datastream. The sample period ranges from 1999 to 2007 and contains 543 SEOs in total. 1 % of observations 
both with highest and lowest CARs and past stock returns are removed from the sample. Financial slack (cash 
and cash equivalents / total assets), Debt / Total assets, Capex / Total assets, EBITDA / Total assets, Market-to-
Book, LNsales and PPE / Total assets are measured at the previous year end. Sales growth is measured in the 
issue year. Dividend is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if firm’s dividend payout ratio is 20 % or higher 
and value of 0 otherwise. R&D is a research and development dummy variable that gets value of 1 if the firm 
reports R&D expenditures and 0 otherwise. Past 12m stock return is the firm’s 12-month raw stock return prior 
to the issue announcement. SENT is the level of UK consumer sentiment index in the issue month. Issue size is 
the total deal value divided by the previous year end market cap. SEO% is the number of SEOs in the UK within 
the event quarter divided by the number public companies at the end of the previous year. T-statistics, with 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors as suggested by White, for no relationship between dependent and 
independent variables are reported next to coefficients, where * and ** denote to statistical significance of the 
relationship at 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. F-statistics and R-squared are reported as measures of model 
explanatory power. 
 
 
 
Independent variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Market-to-Book 0.001 0.78 -0.001 -0.63 0.001 0.63 -0.001 -0.52
Past 12m stock return 0.017 2.93** 0.019 2.04* 0.021 3.48** 0.022 2.68**
Sales growth 0.012 0.91 0.016 0.68 0.011 0.80 0.007 0.38
SEO% 0.750 1.02 0.327 0.30 0.944 1.20 0.391 0.37
Dividend 0.016 1.50 0.025 1.64 0.019 1.73 0.031 2.17*
SENT 0.002 0.64 0.003 0.72 0.002 0.77 -0.001 -0.38
Issue size 0.009 0.87 0.017 1.16 0.011 1.27 0.002 0.22
LNsales -0.001 -0.26 -0.001 -0.13 -0.002 -0.79 -0.003 -0.86
Debt / Total assets 0.034 1.55 0.019 0.56 0.038 1.72 0.014 0.46
PPE / Total assets -0.012 -0.87 -0.048 -2.12* -0.012 -0.84 -0.037 -1.97*
EBITDA / Total assets -0.006 -0.41 -0.030 -1.04 0.007 0.43 0.010 0.62
Financial slack 0.019 0.67 -0.001 -0.01 0.019 0.62 -0.007 -0.16
R&D 0.010 0.94 -0.005 -0.40 0.014 1.35 0.006 0.46
Intercept -0.034 -0.78 -0.003 -0.06 -0.022 -0.45 0.019 0.32
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 1.732 1.629 2.527 1.778
P-value, F-statistic 0.02* 0.04* <0.01** 0.02*
R-squared 0.090 0.085 0.126 0.092
Number of observations 519 519 519 519
  Cross-sectional OLS regression
Market model Market adjusted
[-1,+1] [-5,+5] [-1,+1] [-5,+5]
Dependent variable: SEO announcement CAR [-1,+1] and [-5,+5]
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Multivariate analysis on announcement effect determinants 
I also perform cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate the robustness of the impact 
of  the  hypothesized  variables  on  the  SEO  announcement  effect.  I  control  for  various  firm-
specific characteristics that the literature on SEOs suggests to have an influence on the 
abnormal returns. If the results presented in Table XI are not monotonic, but instead driven by 
subsamples  of  firms  with  extreme  performance,  one  would  expect  regression  analysis  to  
embody  the  fragility  of  the  relationship.  Table  XII  presents  the  results  from  the  regression  
models.  
 
Convincingly, I find past 12-month stock return to have significantly positive sign after the 
inclusion of various control variables in all regression models. The lack of statistical 
significance of market-to-book is not surprising: in earlier research (see, e.g., Dierkens 
(1991), Denis (1994)) the linkage has been positive, but statistically insignificant. The impact 
of sales growth seems two-fold: the statistical significance based on the subsample analysis 
contradicts with the insignificant positive sign in all the regression models. The results on 
sales growth therefore should be interpreted as a further evidence of non-monotonic linkage 
between demand for capital and SEO announcement effect reported earlier by Denis (1994) in 
the US and Burton et al. (2003) in the UK. The SEO% (SEO volume) has expected positive 
sign, but controlling for firm-specific factors makes it statistically insignificant, which is not 
surprising as the analysis in Table XII reveals that only the highest volume subsample 
undergoes significantly positive returns, while the others are leveled-off. Furthermore, 
Appendix A reveals that at least at the macro level, SEO% is strongly positively correlated 
with sales growth, past stock returns and market-to-book, all of which can lower the sign of 
the regression estimate for SEO%. Finally, the control variables are mainly statistically 
insignificant, yet some of them suggest interesting relations between firm characteristics and 
announcement effect to exist. Moreover, investors react more optimistically to SEO 
announcement by dividend paying stocks than non-dividend paying stocks, and the sign of 
leverage remains also modestly positive. Quynh-Nhu (2009), reports similar findings with a 
small sample of Finnish seasoned equity offerings. 
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Figure 4: CARs of SEO firms around the announcement: the impact of issuer characteristics 
The figure shows the impact of 12-month pre-issue market adjusted stock return, issuer 12-month sales growth 
and equity offering volume (SEO%, calculated as all UK SEOs with value over €5 million within a quarter 
divided by the number of listed companies at the end of previous year) on SEO firms’ announcement effect. The 
abnormal returns are calculated using market model on the left hand side (MM) and market adjusted returns on 
the right (MA). All the panels show returns of the highest 20 % (black line), lowest 20 % (dim grey line) and the 
remaining 60 % in between (dark grey line) calculated as equally weighted sample averages. Panels A and B 
present the impact of issuer pre-issue 12-month stock return on announcement effect during [-5,+5] window, 
while Panels C and D show the impact of 12-month sales growth at the issue year during similar [-5,+5] 
window. Panels E and F show the impact of equity offering volume (SEO%) during [-5,+5] window. The 
sample totals 543 SEOs during a period ranging from 1999 to 2007. The grey area highlights [-1,+1] event 
window and the dashed line is positioned in the midpoint of the announcement date.  
 
 
Figure 4 graphically presents the impact of three of the most consistent determinants of SEO 
announcement  effect:  past  stock  returns,  sales  growth  and  SEO volume.  For  robustness,  the  
results are shown both using market model and plain market adjusted abnormal returns. 
Figure  4  shows  that  as  a  result  of  sub  sampling,  the  only  group  of  firms  with  significantly  
negative announcement effect is the quintile of firms with lowest stock market performance 
during 12-month prior to the announcement – the relationship holds using both market model 
and market adjusted returns (Panels A and B). On the other hand, based on the regression 
analysis I conclude that the impact of SEO% and sales growth is not robust and instead 
affected by large differences between firms in the cross-section. 
Robustness check: market timing as a determinant of SEO announcement effect 
The sample period of the thesis ranging from 1999 to 2007 contains IT bubble around the year 
2000, and therefore reflects its consequences. The stock market underwent extreme optimism 
before IT bubble burst in the early 2000, when a number of technology firms sought external 
financing from the market by means of IPOs and SEOs. The bullish period was followed by 
market-wide waves of pessimism with a number of bankruptcies occurring and a large 
fraction of the aggregate stock market wealth vanishing. Theoretically, dramatic shifts in the 
market conditions can bias the results of the event study at the total sample level. So far, past 
stock returns seem to be an important determinant of SEO announcement effect, yet the time 
period employed in the thesis exposes the results to time-varying market conditions. To 
address the robustness of the results, I remove the outlier years from the sample and perform 
regression analysis. 
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Figure 5: The impact of past 12-month stock return on announcement effect annually during the 
sample period 
The figure shows the median market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns of high (20 %) and low (20 %) 
portfolios of SEO firms sorted by raw past 12-month stock return. Firms are sorted separately each year to 
analyze the impact of time on the announcement effect. 1 % of observations with highest and lowest past stock 
returns and CARs are excluded from the total sample respectively. The black bars represent the median CARs of 
20 % of firms with highest past 12-month stock returns each year, while the grey bars represent 20 % with the 
lowest past stock returns. The sample totals 543 SEOs by UK firms during period 1999-2007 sourced from 
Dealogic. The stock data are sourced from Datastream. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the time-varying role of past 12-month stock returns as a determinant of the 
SEO announcement effect. In year 1999, the high stock market performers face extreme 
optimism around the announcement. On the contrary, in year 2001 subsequent to the IT 
bubble burst, low stock market performers undergo extremely low announcement returns. 
During the remaining sample years, the market reaction on SEO announcement is more 
optimistic for high performers than for low performers, while the differences between 
subsamples are much smaller than in years 1999 and 2001. 
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Table XIII 
Regression analysis of announcement effect after removal of years 1999 and 2001 
The table shows OLS regression estimates for determinants of cumulative abnormal returns around the 
announcement of SEOs. The regressions are estimated for event window of [-1,+1] days using both market 
model and market adjusted returns in estimation of CARs. Years 1999 and 2001 show differing announcement 
effect patterns and they are removed from the sample. 1 % of observations both with highest and lowest CARs 
and past stock returns are removed from the sample. The sample of equity issues is sourced from Dealogic, while 
the company financials are sourced from Thomson’s Worldscope and stock data from Datastream. The sample 
period ranges from 1999 to 2007 and contains 543 SEOs in total. Financial slack (cash and cash equivalents / 
total assets), Debt / Total assets, Capex / Total assets, EBITDA / Total assets, Market-to-Book, LNsales and PPE 
/ Total assets are measured at the previous year end. Sales growth is measured in the issue year. Dividend is a 
dummy variable that gets value of 1 if firm’s dividend payout ratio is 20 % or higher and value of 0 otherwise. 
R&D is a research and development dummy variable that gets value of 1 if the firm reports R&D expenditures 
and 0 otherwise. Past 12m stock return is the firm’s 12-month raw stock return prior to the issue announcement. 
SENT is the level of UK consumer sentiment index in the issue month. Issue size is the total deal value divided 
by the previous year end market cap. SEO% is the number of SEOs in the UK within the event quarter divided 
by the number public companies at the end of the previous year. T-statistics, with heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors as suggested by White, for no relationship between dependent and independent variables are 
reported next to coefficients, where * and ** denote to statistical significance of the relationship at 5 % and 1 % 
levels respectively. F-statistics and R-squared are reported as measures of model explanatory power. 
 
 
 
Independent variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Past 12m stock return 0.015 2.57* 0.017 2.79**
Market-to-book 0.001 0.50 0.001 0.57
Sales growth 0.017 1.26 0.013 0.87
SEO% 0.870 1.18 1.131 1.40
Dividend 0.015 1.32 0.011 1.00
SENT 0.001 0.50 0.002 0.62
Issue size 0.003 0.22 0.007 0.68
LNsales -0.004 -1.27 -0.003 -1.01
Debt / Total assets 0.030 1.24 0.028 1.15
PPE / Total assets -0.015 -0.94 -0.013 -0.81
EBITDA / Total assets 0.007 0.45 0.015 0.74
Financial slack 0.026 0.90 0.019 0.60
R&D 0.009 0.91 0.015 1.39
Intercept 0.001 0.02 -0.011 -0.22
Year dummies Yes Yes
F-statistic 1.558 1.849
P-value, F-statistic 0.06 0.02*
R-squared 0.065 0.098
Number of observations 418 418
Dependent variable: SEO announcement CAR [-1,+1] 
after removal of years 1999 and 2001
[-1,+1] [-1,+1]
Market model Market adjusted
  Cross-sectional OLS regression
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Table XIII shows regression estimates for the total sample less years 1999 and 2001. The 
estimated coefficients are well in line with the total period regression estimated in Table XII. 
In addition, the t-statistics of past stock returns in models employing both market model 
(2.57) and market adjusted returns (2.79) remain highly statistically significant. Similarly, all 
the other hypothesized variables of interest maintain their insignificant positive signs. 
Therefore, the robustness checks show that the findings on SEO announcement effect 
determinants are not driven by sub periods of extreme market conditions. 
 
The analysis on announcement effect of SEOs documented in this subsection yield several 
conclusions. Moreover, market timing is the strongest determinant of abnormal returns as the 
positive impact of past stock returns persist after controlling for market-to-book ratio and 
various other issuer characteristics. In addition, the impact of demand for capital, proxied by 
sales growth during the year of the issue, appears to be positive and statistically insignificant 
during a three-day event period at the total sample. Nevertheless, the univariate analysis 
suggests that a weak association exists. Finally, the analysis on equity offering volume as a 
determinant of announcement return suggests that a modest linkage exists, but the relationship 
is driven by subsample of firms issuing during the high volume issue periods. 
6.2.2 Post-issue performance 
In this subsection, I present the findings on issuer long-term post-issue stock market 
performance. To mitigate the bad model or specification problem argued by Barber and Lyon 
(1997) and Lyon et al. (1999), I use both 1) FTSE All-Share index and 2) size and market-to-
book  matched  firms  as  the  benchmark  to  calculate  the  abnormal  returns.  I  also  test  the  
hypotheses H11-H13 on determinants of post-issue performance. Specifically, I employ pre-
issue firm characteristics as the proxies to test the strength of market timing, demand for 
capital and deal size as determinants of post-issue performance. 
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Table XIV 
SEO post-issue performance: total sample 
 
The table shows the post-issue underperformance of seasoned equity offerings at the total sample level. The 
results are estimated and reported using both size and market-to-book matched firms and FTSE All-share index 
as the benchmarks and presented separately for [0,+24] and [0,+36] event windows. The sample of equity issues 
is sourced from Dealogic, while the stock data is sourced from Datastream. The sample period ranges from 1999 
to 2007 and contains 543 SEOs in total.  1 % with largest and smallest BHARs is sorted out from the sample. 
Equally weighted sample averages and proportion of positive BHARs are reported. The beginning of the event 
period, t=0, is set to the closing of the next trading following the issue date reported by Dealogic. T-statistics of 
no difference from zero are reported next to averages, where * and ** denote to statistical significance of the 
difference at 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Table XIV above shows that SEO firms underperform in comparison to both benchmarks 
during 24-month and 36-month periods of interest. The findings on post-issue performance 
are consistent with the earlier research on UK SEOs by Ngatuni et al. (2007) and 
Andrikopoulos (2009). However, my empirical results indicate that using benchmark firms 
matched on both market-to-book and firm size yields less negative estimates for abnormal 
returns  (24-month  BHAR:  -8.2  %)  as  the  benchmarks  matched  on  a  single  criterion  in  the  
mentioned studies (24-month BHAR varies from -13.9 % to -18.0 % depending on the 
benchmark in Andrikopoulos (2009)). The differences between the FTSE All-Share and 
matching firm benchmarked abnormal returns in the cross-section are large, since 44.6 % of 
the firms do not underperform using matching firms, while the same figure is 34.3 % using 
FTSE All-Share as the benchmark. The results imply that SEO underperformance as a 
phenomenon partly vanishes when using well specified matching firms, but still the 
underperformance remains marginally statistically significant. Nevertheless, the topic has 
been debated extensively in the recent literature (see, e.g., Barber and Lyon (1997), Jegadeesh 
(2000)).   
 
 
 
 
Event window
Average t-stat % positive Average t-stat % positive
BHAR, Match -8.2 % -2.24* 47.1 % -13.5 % -2.48* 44.6 %
BHAR, FTSE -14.6 % -5.17** 34.7 % -17.4 % -4.35** 34.3 %
[0,+24] [0,+36]
Total sample of SEOs (n=543) Post-issue BHARs
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Figure 6: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns of SEO firms: post-issue period 
The figure shows buy-and-hold abnormal returns for equity issuers during 36-month event period [0,+36] 
subsequent to an SEO. The dark line shows equally-weighted sample average BHAR using size and market-to-
book matched firms as the benchmark, while the dim line employs FTSE All-Share index as the benchmark. 1 % 
with the lowest and highest BHARs are removed from the series. All UK SEOs with a deal value in excess of €5 
million during period 1999-2007 are sourced from Dealogic making a total sample consisting of 543 SEOs. 
Accounting data for matching firms are retrieved from Thomson’s Worldscope, while stock data are sourced 
from Datastream. The beginning of the event period, t=0, is set to the closing of the next trading following the 
issue date reported by Dealogic. 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the total sample of SEOs. Moreover, as 
can be seen from the figure, the model choice is critical to the results observed. As the equally 
weighted BHAR using FTSE All-Share as the benchmark yield an average 24-month return of 
-14.6 % the BHAR using matching firms yield an average return of -8.2 %. Both figures are 
statistically significantly different from zero at the conventional 5 % significance level. 
 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) throw light on the new issues’ poor performance subsequent to an 
issue. Since their arguments, numerous papers address the anomalous performance of the 
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issuers. Furthermore, two of the often noted arguments for the underperformance are 
successful market timing by the managers and deterioration of the operating performance 
following an issue. In other words, equity issues imply overvaluation or alternatively, they are 
actually non-events – firm specific factors explain the underperformance in the long horizon. 
Jegadeesh (2000) argues that investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of the new 
issues and realize it only in the longer term. In response to the studies on shifts in long-term 
operative  performance,  I  test  the  impact  of  pre-issue  characteristics  on  the  long-term  post-
issue performance. I hypothesize that firms who signal overvaluation at the announcement 
should be poor long-term investments, while the firms who demand capital for investments or 
growth  could  theoretically  use  the  proceeds  efficiently  and  show  less  signs  of  
underperformance. In addition, I find that at the total sample level, SEO firms underperform 
subsequent to the issue, and hypothesize that SEO underperformance increases with deal size. 
Finally, I further test whether investors can distinct between good and bad SEOs at the time of 
announcement. 
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Table XV 
SEO post-issue performance: abnormal returns and issuer characteristics 
 
The table shows the impact of issuer/issue specific factors on the post-issue stock market performance of SEO 
firms. Firms are sorted into quintiles or subsamples based on announcement CAR [-1,+1], 12-month raw pre-
announcement stock returns, whether the company reports R&D expenditures in the fiscal year prior to the issue, 
sales growth during issue year, capital expenditure growth during issue year and the issue size. The t-test of 
equal means and Wilcoxon signed-rank z-test of equal medians between HIGH quintile and LOW quintile 
BHARs address the impact of the given factor to the post-issue performance. 1 % of observations with largest 
and smallest BHARs are removed from the sample.  The sample of equity issues is sourced from Dealogic, while 
the company financials are sourced from Thomson’s Worldscope and stock data from Datastream. The sample 
period ranges from 1999 to 2007 and contains 543 SEOs in total. The beginning of the event period, t=0, is set to 
the closing of the next trading following the issue date reported by Dealogic. T-statistics and z-statistics for no 
difference between HIGH and LOW quintiles are reported next to coefficients, where * and ** denote to 
statistical significance of the difference at 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. 
 
 
  
[0,+6] [0,+12] [0,+18] [0,+24] [0,+30] [0,+36]
Announcement CAR [-1,+1]
HIGH (average) 2 % 13 % -3 % -3 % -14 % -10 %
LOW (average) 0 % -10 % -6 % -15 % -23 % -18 %
t-stat , difference 0.28 2.54 * 0.25 0.92 0.58 0.44
Wilcoxon, z-stat -0.23 2.57 ** 0.19 0.25 -0.39 -0.30
12-month raw pre-announcement stock return
HIGH (average) 2 % 6 % -7 % -15 % -28 % -27 %
LOW (average) -4 % -12 % -5 % -10 % -5 % -2 %
t-stat , difference 1.10 1.96* -0.25 -0.38 -1.42 -1.29
Wilcoxon, z-stat 0.84 1.62 -0.85 -0.73 -1.76 -1.44
R&D expenditure
Reports (average) 4 % 11 % 13 % 13 % 6 % 11 %
Doesn't report (average) -2 % -2 % -10 % -14 % -18 % -20 %
t-stat , difference 1.53 2.12 * 3.27 ** 3.04 ** 2.18 * 2.41 *
Wilcoxon, z-stat 1.57 2.89 ** 3.13 ** 2.69 ** 2.43 * 2.30 *
Sales growth-%
HIGH (average) -13 % 3 % -8 % -2 % -3 % 0 %
LOW (average) -5 % 0 % -21 % -20 % -33 % -34 %
t-stat , difference -0.48 0.18 0.99 0.92 1.51 1.31
Wilcoxon, z-stat 0.54 0.90 0.53 1.59 1.15 0.60
Capex growth-%
HIGH (average) 0 % 15 % 1 % -5 % -17 % -9 %
LOW (average) -10 % -9 % -13 % -14 % -20 % -24 %
t-stat , difference 1.22 2.01 * 1.23 0.53 0.13 0.57
Wilcoxon, z-stat 1.52 1.38 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.24
Deal size
HIGH (average) -3 % 1 % -2 % -9 % -15 % -29 %
LOW (average) 0 % 1 % -5 % -7 % -12 % -8 %
t-stat , difference -0.57 0.04 0.37 -0.18 -0.22 -1.20
Wilcoxon, z-stat -0.54 -1.01 -0.64 -0.89 -1.26 -1.60
Event period (months)  Post issue BHAR
  Benchmark: matching firms
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Univariate analysis on determinants of post-issue underperformance  
Table XV above presents the equally weighted abnormal stock market performance of 
subsamples of size and market-to-book matched SEOs sorted by the variables of interest. The 
observation period ranges from six to 36 months.  
i)  Announcement returns 
I find that the firms with the most optimistic market reaction at the announcement of the SEO 
are superior investments during 12-month horizon as opposed to the poorest quintile of firms 
at the announcement. However, the difference in BHARs between subsamples of firms 
converges after one year from the announcement. All in all, investors seem to have some 
ability to pick the best issues at the announcement. 
ii)  Market timing 
The role of past stock returns in explaining post-issue stock market performance is two-
parted: first, high pre-issue stock return firms are good investments during short horizons of 
six and twelve months, but they start underperforming in the longer term. Moreover, the worst 
performers prior to the issue seem not to underperform significantly during periods of 24 to 
36 months. These findings indicate that the market timing is a strong determinant of post-
issue underperformance in the UK. The found stock return pattern around SEOs is fully 
consistent with the literature on momentum, which explains that the strong performing 
portfolio of firms during the previous six months face higher abnormal returns on firm 
announcements and are superior short-term investments during periods of 12 months or less 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
iii)  Demand for capital 
I employ three different proxies of demand for capital as the issuer characteristics that could 
explain long-term underperformance: whether firm reports research & development 
expenditures, issue year sales growth and issue year capital expenditures. I find strong 
evidence that firms who commit and report R&D expenditures are superior investments as 
opposed to the firms who do not report R&D expenditures. In addition, both sales growth and 
capital expenditure growth have hypothesized sign, yet only capital expenditure growth at 12-
month period after issue has statistically significantly positive sign at 5 % level. The existing 
literature partly contradicts with the findings presented in Table XV. Lyandres et al. (2008) 
argue that SEO firms invest significantly more than their non-issuing peers and additionally, 
adjusting for the difference in investment explains large part of the observed 
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underperformance of SEOs. Lyandres et al. (2008) and Carlson et al. (2006) hypothesize that 
the increase in investment ultimately reduces firm risk and decreases expected return. One 
possible explanation for the positive linkage between capital demand proxies and BHARs is 
the use of matching firm technique. Using a sample of French firms, Jeanneret (2005) finds 
investment related SEOs to yield significantly negative abnormal returns, while using a large 
US sample, Autore et al. (2009) report findings that question the true form of the 
phenomenon. Moreover, issuers who state that the purpose of the issue is to raise cash for 
investment purposes perform significantly better than the other use of proceeds classes. 
Should the use of appropriate matches control for the differences in investment opportunities 
across firms, then sales growth, capex growth and R&D expenditures could be interpreted as 
measures of firm quality rather than investment opportunities. 
iv)  Issue size 
I test the impact of relative issue size (measured as total deal value divided by the last year 
end market cap) on the post-issue stock market performance. I do not find significant 
relationship between issue size and issuer performance to exist. During most of the estimation 
windows,  issuers  with  large  deal  size  seem  to  be  worse  off  than  the  small  issuers,  but  the  
relation seems weak. However, the decrease in the performance of firms with large issue sizes 
after 12 months following an issue indicates that the large deal sizes are associated with 
elements of market timing attempt by the managers. 
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Table XVI 
SEO post-issue performance: regression analysis of abnormal returns 
 
The table shows OLS regression estimates for determinants of buy-and-hold abnormal returns following an SEO 
announcement. The regressions are estimated for event periods of [0,+24] and [0,+36] months using both size & 
market-to-book matched firms and FTSE All-Share stock index as benchmarks in estimation of BHARs. The 
sample of equity issues is sourced from Dealogic, while the company financials are sourced from Thomson’s 
Worldscope and stock data from Datastream. The sample period ranges from 1999 to 2007 and contains 543 
SEOs in total. 24 firms have missing data items which reduce the number of observations in regressions to 519. 
In addition, the regressions with 36-month event period contain 393 observations. Financial slack (cash and cash 
equivalents / total assets), Debt / Total assets, EBITDA / Total assets, Market-to-Book, LNsales and PPE / Total 
assets are measured at the previous year end. Sales growth and Capex growth are measured in the issue year. 
Dividend is a dummy variable that gets value of 1 if firm’s dividend payout ratio is 20 % or higher and value of 
0 otherwise. R&D is a research and development dummy variable that gets value of 1 if the firm reports R&D 
expenditures and 0 otherwise. Past 12m stock return is the firm’s raw stock return prior to the issue 
announcement. Issue size is the total deal value divided by the previous year end market cap. SEO% is number 
of SEOs in the UK divided by the number public companies at the end of previous year. The beginning of the 
event period, t=0, is set to the closing of the next trading following the issue date reported by Dealogic. 1 % of 
observations both with highest and lowest CARs and past stock returns are removed from the sample. T-
statistics, with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors as suggested by White, for no relationship between 
dependent and independent variables are reported next to coefficients, where * and ** denote to statistical 
significance of relationship at 5 % and 1 % levels respectively. F-statistics and R-squared are reported as 
measures of model explanatory power.  
 
 
Independent variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
CAR [-1,+1] 1.121 1.87 0.250 0.34 1.666 3.02** 0.826 1.48
Past 12m Stock return -0.268 -2.53* -0.141 -1.48 -0.129 -2.88** -0.089 -2.02*
R&D 0.108 0.73 0.219 1.12 0.052 0.47 0.111 0.75
Sales growth 0.210 1.26 0.172 0.66 0.081 0.68 0.202 1.00
Capex growth 0.052 0.65 0.073 0.59 0.007 0.11 0.015 0.18
Issue size -0.280 -2.98** -0.468 -4.49** -0.105 -1.69 -0.213 -3.02**
Market to Book -0.017 -1.54 -0.018 -1.58 -0.029 -2.36* -0.031 -2.02*
LN sales -0.045 -1.61 -0.063 -1.71 -0.002 -0.07 -0.003 -0.07
Debt / Total assets -0.490 -1.76 -0.077 -0.20 -0.344 -1.66 0.114 0.43
EBITDA / Total assets -0.142 -0.55 -0.242 -1.06 0.002 0.01 0.092 0.43
PPE / Total assets -0.320 -1.52 -0.227 -0.86 -0.017 -0.10 0.018 0.10
Financial slack -0.093 -0.30 0.002 0.01 -0.392 -1.35 -0.276 -0.78
Dividend 0.066 0.55 0.199 1.09 -0.012 -0.12 0.019 0.14
SEO% -0.833 -0.12 -9.107 -0.99 -9.556 -1.55 -12.508 -1.53
Intercept 0.779 2.15* 1.158 1.83 0.743 1.60 0.639 1.00
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 2.171 1.160 2.422 1.677
P-value, F-statistic <0.01** 0.29 <0.01** 0.03*
R-squared 0.119 0.082 0.131 0.115
Number of observations 519 393 519 393
[0,+24] [0,+36] [0,+24] [0,+36]
  Cross-sectional OLS regression
BHAR: Matching firm BHAR: FTSE All-Share
Dependent variable: SEO post-announcement BHAR [0,+24] and 
[0,+36]
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Multivariate analysis on determinants of post-issue underperformance  
To test the robustness of the findings, I perform cross-sectional multivariate regression 
analysis of BHARs controlling for various issuer specific characteristics. The regression 
estimates are presented in Table XVI. The coefficients of both announcement CAR and past 
stock  returns  have  expected  sign  and  show statistical  significance  in  some of  the  regression  
models. The strong negative impact of pre-issue 12-month stock return on 24-month BHAR 
shows that market timing hypothesis seems to explain a fraction of the post-issue 
underperformance after controlling for various firm specific variables suggested in the 
literature. Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that market-to-book and size factors explain part 
of the observed abnormal returns, which suggest that the variables should be included as 
control variables. Moreover, I find that the two variables, namely market-to-book and 
LNsales, have negative and partly statistically significant relationship with the abnormal 
returns following an SEO. 
 
Based on the regression estimates, the demand for capital hypothesis seems weaker in 
determining  the  abnormal  returns  of  SEO  firms  than  was  expected  based  on  the  univariate  
analysis. While all the three proxies of demand for capital hypothesis have persistent positive 
sign,  none  of  them  has  statistical  significance  at  any  of  the  conventional  levels.  A  possible  
explanation of the modest regression estimates is the positive correlation among the three 
variables which weakens the regression estimates to a certain degree. The hypothesized 
negative impact of issue size is persistent during long holding periods as both models with 36-
month  estimation  period  yield  test  statistics  highly  significant  at  1  %  level.  Finally,  SEO  
volume and leverage suggest small negative relation with post-issue performance. The 
negative sign of the SEO volume supports the existing literature. Namely, Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) state that SEOs cluster into opportunistic periods, which are particularly 
vulnerable for long-term underperformance.  
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Figure 7: BHARs of SEO firms post-issue: the impact of issuer characteristics 
The figure shows the impact of issuer/issue specific factors on the post-issue stock market performance of SEO 
firms measured as buy-and-hold abnormal returns using size and market-to-book matched firms as the 
benchmark. Firms are sorted into quintiles based on announcement CAR [-1,+1], 12-month raw pre-
announcement raw stock returns, whether the company reports R&D expenditures in the fiscal year prior to the 
issue, sales growth- % during the issue year, capital expenditure growth- % during the issue year and the issue 
size in percentage of last year end market capitalization. 1 % with highest and lowest BHARs are removed from 
the series. The dark and dim bars show the equally weighted average BHAR of HIGH and LOW quintile 
respectively. The sample of equity issues is sourced from Dealogic, while the company financials are sourced 
from Thomson’s Worldscope and stock data from Datastream. The sample period ranges from 1999 to 2007 and 
contains  543  SEOs  in  total.  The  beginning  of  the  event  period,  t=0,  is  set  to  the  closing  of  the  next  trading  
following the issue date reported by Dealogic. 
 
 
Figure 7 graphically illustrates the impact of pre-issue characteristics of issuers on long-term 
abnormal  returns  post-issue.  Panel  B  plots  the  impact  of  pre-issue  raw  stock  return  on  the  
post-issue performance. Moreover, while strong past stock market performers seem superior 
investments during short horizons, they clearly start to underperform after 12 months 
following an issue. As described before and plotted in Panel C, the presence of research and 
development expenditures gives strong indication on post-issue performance. Namely, the 
firms reporting R&D expenditures outperform their non-issuing benchmarks, while the 
reverse holds for non-reporting firms. Should the SEOs underperform on average, one would 
expect larger deal sizes to imply more severe underperformance. Panel F plots the relationship 
and indicates that larger issue sizes are among the worst investments in the long-term. 
 
The analysis of post-issue underperformance reveals that using matching firms instead of 
FTSE All-Share as the benchmark for normal returns considerably decreases the estimates of 
aggregate underperformance. At the cross-sectional level, firms with high past stock returns 
and large issue size seem to be poor investments at the longer term. Various proxies on 
demand for capital indicate positive relation with post-issue performance. However, based on 
the  regression  analysis,  none  of  capital  demand proxies  has  a  robust  statistically  significant  
relationship. All in all, the findings indicate that investors are worse off when participating in 
market timing driven SEOs as opposed to the issues by high demand for capital firms, who 
can put the proceeds into efficient use.  
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Table XVII 
Summary of findings on issuer stock market performance 
 
The table pools together the hypotheses on stock market performance of the SEO firms around the 
announcement as well as in the post-issue period, the proxy variables employed in the tests and the empirical 
findings on the hypotheses. The “+” (positive linkage) and “–“ (negative linkage) signs after the hypotheses 
address the theoretical prediction of the relationship between each class of hypotheses and the abnormal stock 
market performance. The column on the right indicates whether the hypothesis ought to be accepted based on the 
empirical findings. 
 
 
 
To pool together the various tests and hypotheses on issuer stock market performance, Table 
XVII summarizes the major findings and documents the proxies used to test hypothesized 
relations. The role of market timing hypothesis seems strong in explaining announcement 
effect, while the momentum firms continue to perform strongly during periods of less than 12 
months following the issue. Yet, as hypothesized, the market timers turn out to be poor 
investments during periods over 24 months. Larger issue sizes also perform poorly at the long 
horizon, which can possibly reflect the fact that some firms exploit market timing by issuing 
more capital than they can actually put into efficient use. The hypothesized positive linkage 
between SEO volume and announcement effect is driven by subsample of firms that time their 
issues for high SEO volume periods, while the evidence on demand for capital as a 
determinant of announcement return seems much the same. Finally, various proxies on 
demand for capital indicate that firms who can invest the issue proceeds in positive NPV 
projects can avoid post-issue underperformance.  
 
  
SEO announcement effect: ex ante firm/issue characteristics determining the announcement effect
Hypotheses & prediction Proxies Accepted/Rejected
H8: SEO volume (+) Quarterly number of SEOs / number of listed firms Weak support
H9: Demand for capital (+) Sales growth-% Weak support
H10: Market timing (+) Market-to-book, past 12m stock return Accepted
Long-term performance: ex ante firm/issue characteristics determining the post-issue performance
H11: Market timing (-) Pre-issue 12m stock return Accepted
H12: Demand for capital (+) R&D expenditure, Capex growth-%, Sales growth-% Weak support
H13: Issue size (-) Total proceeds / previous year end market cap Accepted
  Summary of findings: issuer stock market performance
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis was motivated by lacking understanding of various SEO mechanisms in the UK as 
concluded by Andrikopoulos (2009), who show that SEO firms post-issue operating 
performance deteriorates following the issue. The limited empirical evidence on UK SEOs 
motivates an investigation of various SEO phenomena from the perspective of the traditional 
theories on firm financial policy. In addition, inspired by the recent unpublished working 
paper on macro determinants of SEOs by Howe and Zhang (2009), which to my best 
knowledge is the first attempt to study the phenomenon from multiple theories’ perspective, I 
provide new evidence and deepen the understanding on drivers of SEO cycles. 
 
This thesis studies various financial theories’ impacts on the equity offering decision and their 
consequences  on  SEO firms’  stock  market  performance.  In  the  first  empirical  section  6.1,  I  
employed UK data sample to 1) analyze the macro determinants of SEOs and 2) to distinct 
between different micro level determinants of SEOs. In section 6.2, I additionally 3) analyze 
the determinants of issuer announcement effect and 4) investigate the impact of firm-specific 
ex ante characteristics on the issuer post-issue performance. At the macro level, I investigated 
the drivers of fluctuation in seasoned equity offering volume using data for period 1994 to 
2008 including 2,670 SEOs by UK firms listed in the London Stock Exchange. At the cross-
sectional level, I analyzed the determinants of equity vs. debt issue choice by using 423 firm 
years with an SEO and 1,096 firm years with a debt issue during period from 1999 to 2007. 
Finally, I studied the impact of firm-specific pre-issue accounting and stock market variables 
on the abnormal returns of issuers around the announcement and in the long-term using data 
on 543 SEOs during period from 1999 to 2007. 
 
At the macro level, I report both demand for capital and market timing conditions to have a 
strong impact on the SEO volume. Equity offering volume increases along with aggregate 
sales growth prospects of public firms and decreases with rising risk-free rate. Similarly, past 
stock market returns positively affect SEO volume, while the future stock returns have 
negative, but less clear linkage. At the cross-sectional level, much of the same patterns exist, 
while I also find firms with high leverage and research and development expenditures to 
choose issuing equity over debt. SEO announcement effect is positively affected by past stock 
returns,  and  to  some extent  by  sales  growth  and  SEO volume,  all  the  findings  being  in  line  
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with  the  predictions  of  the  adverse  selection  models.  Finally,  firms  with  high  past  stock  
returns perform strongly during short periods following an issue, but turn out to be poor 
investment during periods of 24 or 36 months. On the contrary, firms with demand for capital 
and research and development expenditures appear to be good investments post-issue. Firms 
with large issue sizes underperform considerably more than firms with small issues, who 
actually experience only modest underperformance. Table XVIII below summarizes the 
empirical evidence to support the hypotheses tested in the thesis. 
 
Table XVIII 
Summary of findings 
 
 
Macro determinants (multivariate OLS regressions in section 6.1)
H1 Macro volume of SEOs increases with market 
timing.
Strong evidence. Past (t  = 2.73) and future returns (t  = -3.81) on FTSE All-
Share index are statistically significant at 1 % level.
H2 Macro volume of SEOs decreases with 
asymmetric information.
Weak support. Market volatility is negatively associated with SEO volume 
(t  = -2.62), while analyst dispersion does not have explanatory power.
H3 Macro volume of SEOs increases with 
demand for capital.
Strong evidence. Both future aggregate sales growth (t  = 3.83) and interest 
rates (t  = -4.51) are highly significant at all convent ional levels.
H4 Macro volume of SEOs increases with 
investor sentiment.
No support for H4 found.
Micro determinants (multivariate logit regressions in section 6.1)
H5 The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt 
issue increases with market tim ing.
Strong evidence. Past 12-month stock returns are persistent ly significant 
at 1 % level, while also the estimates for M / B and post-issue stock returns 
support the hypothesized relationship.
H6 The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt 
issue decreases with asymmetric information.
Strong evidence. Both analyst coverage (t  = 2.62) and leverage (t  = 3.59) 
are persistent ly statist ically significant in various mult ivariate models.
H7 The likelihood of an SEO relative to a debt 
issue increases with demand for capital.
Strong evidence. Sales growth (t  = 2.51) and R&D dummy variable (t  = 
3.97) are positively associated with the equity issue likelihood.
Announcement effect (univariate subsample analysis and multivariate OLS regressions in section 6.2)
H8 SEO announcement return increases with 
SEO volume.
Weak support. Univariate analysis reveals that the highest subsample of 
hot period issuers undergo posit ive announcement returns (2.2 %, t  = 
2.42), yet mult ivariate analysis shows that results are non-monotonic.
H9 SEO announcement return increases with 
demand for capital.
Weak support. The role of sales growth seems persistent based on the 
univariate analysis, but weakens after controlling for issuer specific factors.
H10 SEO announcement return increases with 
market timing.
Strong evidence. The role of past 12-month stock return is persistent in 
univariate analysis (HIGH - LOW difference 5.5%, t  = 3.75), mult ivariate 
regressions (t  = 2.93) and persists in robustness checks (t  = 2.57).
Post-issue performance (univariate subsample analysis and multivariate OLS regressions in section 6.2)
H11 SEO long-term underperformance increases 
with market timing.
Strong evidence. High past stock return firms are good investments during 
short periods, but underperform during longer periods (24m: t  = -2.53)
H12 SEO long-term underperformance decreases 
with demand for capital.
Weak support. Sales growth, R&D and capex growth all seem to be 
posit ively related to the post-issue performance, yet none of them is 
significant in multivariate regressions.
H13 SEO long-term underperformance increases 
with deal size.
Strong evidence. All analyses indicate that large issues perform poorly the 
longer the holding period (36m: t  = -4.49).
  Hypothesis   Empirical evidence
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The purpose of the study was to investigate the timing of equity issues, which firm types are 
likely to issue equity and finally, which issues can be value adding to investors. A better 
understanding of SEO determinants can proceed into valuable insights – both from academics 
and practitioners perspectives. Furthermore, the post-issue underperformance reported by 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), and reaffirmed in this thesis, does not imply that all SEOs are 
bad investments as such, but in fact accentuates the importance of understanding why 
sometimes an SEO could be interpreted as a sale signal, and at other times a positive 
indication of the firm’s future. A possible implication of the findings is that an investor, who 
can distinct between market timing driven and demand for capital driven SEOs, is able avoid 
post-issue underperformance’s adverse wealth effects by only holding on to stocks of firms 
who can signal their rationale for the use of issue proceeds. On the contrary, the findings on 
issuer stock market performance suggest that investing in SEOs of firms with high past stock 
returns who issue relatively large amount of equity can be hazardous for shareholders’ wealth. 
 
The relatively large transaction costs of external capital issues suggest that ex ante 
shareholders benefit from the SEOs only when 1) firm is trading above its intrinsic value or 2) 
positive NPV projects (in excess of cost of capital and transaction costs) exist and internally 
generated capital is not available. Therefore, following shareholders’ interest guides the firm 
directly to issue equity due to one of the two mutually non-exclusive motives: market timing 
or demand for capital. The empirical findings indicate that both market timing theory of 
equity issuance and demand for capital theory are present at all levels of SEOs:  macro, micro 
and as determinants of stock market performance around the issue. All in all, while the 
theoretical arguments for the existence of various motives for seasoned equity offerings are 
clear, investors’ wealth considerations necessitate a better understanding of market timing, 
demand for capital and the other prominent theories of security issuance. Clearly, potential 
investors need to understand why the firms in the first place issue equity, to be able adjust 
valuations to the level of firms’ intrinsic value. 
 
Despite SEOs being among the most researched topics in the corporate finance literature, gaps 
to fill still exist. Behavioral aspects of corporate finance are clearly one such area. Moreover, 
Baker et al. (2005) discuss the various aspects of behavioral corporate finance. They conclude 
that while it is clear investor sentiment is present in the stock market and in firm financial 
policy, the correct specifications to measure and quantify its consequences are under a debate. 
Moreover, measuring investor sentiment at cross-sectional level would open up room for 
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further investigation of SEO determinants and perhaps more interestingly, enable quantifying 
its consequences on the stock price mechanics around seasoned equity offerings. 
 
Countries are different in terms of the role of financial institutions as stock market investors. 
Similarly, some firms are mainly held by financial institutions, while others are dispersely 
held by households and other investor groups. Quantifying the micro level impact of 
ownership structure or the macro level institutional setting of the country on the stock market 
performance of equity issuers would be of high interest. Jenter (2005) points out that SEOs 
coincide with insider selling. Moreover, the stock price implication of insiders’ transactions 
around SEO announcements provides an interesting topic for future research. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1: Sample collection process of non-SEO control sample for logit regression 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation coefficients: macro level determinants 
SEO% is the total number of UK SEOs in a given quarter divided by the number of listed companies at the end 
of the previous year. Stdev is the daily standard deviation of FTSE All-Share index within a quarter. Analyst 
dispersion is the weighted average standard deviation of analyst recommendations on FTSE 100 index 
companies at the end of the preceding quarter. GDP is the UK GDP growth from 1 quarter before to 2 quarters 
after the given quarter. Sales is the average sales growth of all UK listed companies from 1 quarter to 4 quarters 
following the given quarter. Int. is the average LIBOR rate from 4 quarters prior to 1 quarter prior to the given 
quarter. SENT is the level of UK consumer sentiment in the quarter. M/B is the median market-to-book of all 
UK listed companies. Mret, pre is the return on FTSE All-Share index from four quarters to one quarter prior to 
the given quarter. Mret, post is the return on FTSE All-Share index from one quarter to four quarters following 
the given quarter. 
 
 
 
  
Step N Source
(1)  Total number of listed firm years, 1999-2007 15,546 Worldscope
(2)  Less firm years with an SEO, 1999-2007 1,693 Dealogic
(3)  Total number of listed firm years with no SEO 13,853
(4)  Less firm years with data items missing 4,723 Worldscope
(5)  Final control sample 9,130
Note: Number of firm years with an SEO is smaller than the initial sample of SEOs sourced from Dealogic, since  
multiple issues by a single issuer during a calendar year is treated as a single firm year with an SEO
Collection of the non-SEO control sample employed in the model (5) in micro determinant logit 
regression
SEO% Stdev Analyst GDP Sales Int. SENT M/B Mret, pre Mret, post
SEO% 1.00
Stdev -0.42 1.00
Analyst 0.08 -0.43 1.00
GDP 0.06 -0.38 0.10 1.00
Sales 0.36 -0.40 0.11 0.46 1.00
Int. -0.16 0.05 -0.24 0.07 0.29 1.00
SENT 0.05 -0.18 0.13 0.41 0.55 -0.03 1.00
M/B 0.27 -0.61 0.25 0.43 0.55 0.29 0.29 1.00
Mret, pre 0.47 -0.49 0.19 0.36 0.65 0.24 0.36 0.72 1.00
Mret, post -0.17 -0.30 0.25 0.24 0.23 -0.09 -0.01 0.20 0.19 1.00
Correlation coefficients between macro-level variables
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Appendix 3: Correlation coefficients: micro level determinants 
VOL is stdev of firms’ daily stock return measured from 250 trading days before the issue to 50 trading days 
before the issue. ANA is analyst coverage dummy variable gets value of 1 if the firm is followed by one or more 
analysts, and value of 0 otherwise. PRE and POST stock returns are calculated as the firm’s raw returns for the 
12-month period prior to and following an issue. DIV is a dividend dummy variable that gets value of 1 if firm’s 
dividend payout ratio is 20 % or higher and value of 0 otherwise. R&D is a research and development dummy 
variable  that  gets  value  of  1  if  the  firm  reports  R&D  expenditures  and  0  otherwise.   Slack  (cash  and  cash  
equivalents / total assets), LEV (Debt / Total assets), INV (Capex / Total assets), ROA (EBITDA / Total assets), 
M / B, SIZE (LNsales) and TNG (PPE / Total assets) are measured at the previous year end. GRO (Sales growth) 
is measured in the issue year. 
 
 
  
Correlation coefficients between issuer characteristics, equity and debt issuers
VOL ANA Slack LEV M / B INV GRO
Stock 
PRE
Stock 
POST TNG DIV R&D ROA SIZE
VOL 1.00
ANA -0.09 1.00
Slack 0.08 -0.38 1.00
LEV 0.11 -0.08 0.14 1.00
M / B -0.12 0.09 -0.07 0.06 1.00
INV 0.06 0.26 -0.25 0.02 0.11 1.00
GRO 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.31 1.00
Stock PRE 0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.15 0.02 1.00
Stock POST 0.08 -0.28 0.34 0.60 -0.04 -0.16 -0.03 0.10 1.00
TNG 0.24 -0.19 0.06 -0.04 -0.21 -0.10 0.00 0.09 0.04 1.00
DIV 0.09 0.14 -0.14 -0.08 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 1.00
R&D 0.21 -0.07 -0.03 0.09 -0.11 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.32 0.00 1.00
ROA 0.49 -0.15 0.18 -0.03 -0.23 -0.10 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.36 0.14 0.32 1.00
SIZE -0.14 0.20 -0.17 -0.04 0.08 0.11 -0.17 -0.15 -0.16 -0.33 0.14 -0.27 -0.18 1.00
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Appendix 4: The sample of SEOs by industries 
The table presents the seasoned equity offerings by industries. The distribution of SEOs is shown separately for 
macro determinants sample and for the issuer stock market performance sample. The classification of industries 
is based on general industry groupings (GIG) as reported in Dealogic database. The number of issues by industry 
and the %-share of total sample are shown separately. 
 
 
  Seasoned equity offerings by industries
Macro determinants sample (n=2,670)
Number of issues % of total sample Number of issues % of total sample
Aerospace 2 0.1 % 2 0.4 %
Agribusiness 5 0.2 % 4 0.7 %
Auto/Truck 42 1.6 % 6 1.1 %
Chemicals 29 1.1 % 7 1.3 %
Computers & Electronics 390 14.6 % 92 16.9 %
Construction & Building 122 4.6 % 30 5.5 %
Consumer Products 47 1.8 % 10 1.8 %
Defense 12 0.5 % 5 0.9 %
Dining & Lodging 54 2.0 % 8 1.5 %
Finance 318 11.9 % 47 8.7 %
Food & Beverage 48 1.8 % 13 2.4 %
Forestry & Paper 8 0.3 % 5 0.9 %
Healthcare 233 8.7 % 60 11.0 %
Holding companies 13 0.5 % 4 0.7 %
Insurance 91 3.4 % 18 3.3 %
Leisure & Recreation 109 4.1 % 18 3.3 %
Machinery 23 0.9 % 6 1.1 %
Metal & Steel 21 0.8 % 1 0.2 %
Mining 161 6.0 % 25 4.6 %
Oil & Gas 169 6.3 % 30 5.5 %
Professional Services 253 9.5 % 68 12.5 %
Publishing 73 2.7 % 9 1.7 %
Real Estate & Property 133 5.0 % 29 5.3 %
Retail 66 2.5 % 8 1.5 %
Telecommunications 156 5.8 % 21 3.9 %
Textile 7 0.3 % 2 0.4 %
Transportation 45 1.7 % 7 1.3 %
Utility & Energy 39 1.4 % 8 1.5 %
Total 2,670 100.0 % 543 100.0 %
Stock market performance sample 
(n=543)
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Appendix 5: Definition of data items employed 
 
 
Macro variables
Interest rate (3-month avg.) DS: UKESEFI3R
GDP DS: UKOEXP03D
Consumer sentiment index DS: UKCNFCONQ
Sales growth-% All UK listed firms in the LSE, calculation same as below
Market-to-book All UK listed firms in the LSE, calculation same as below
Micro variables
Analyst coverage (dummy) IBH.NbrRecommendationsSell/Underperform/Hold/Buy/Strongbuy
Debt / Total assets WS.TotalDebt / WS.TotalAssets
Sales growth-% WS.Sales1YrGrowth
R&D (dummy) WS.ResearchAndDevelomentExpense
Capex / Total assets WS.CapitalExpendituresCFStmt / WS.TotalAssets
Market-to-book DS.CommonSharesOutstanding * DS.PriceClose / WS.TotalCommonEquity
EBITDA / Total assets WS.EarningsBeforeIntTaxesAndDepr / WS.TotalAssets
Dividend (dummy) WS.DividendPayout
Financial Slack WS.CashAndCashequivalents / WS.TotalAssets
LnSales LN(WS.Sales)
PPE / Total assets WS.PropertyPlantAndEquipment / WS.TotalAssets
Issue size Deal Value Euro (Dealogic) / DS.CommonSharesOutstanding * DS.PriceClose
DS = Datastream, WS=Worldscope, IBH=IBES History
  Financial data items employed
